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A large fraction of American families reach retirement age with virtually no 
personal financial assets. The median level of all personal financial assets of 
families with heads aged 55-64  was only $8,300 in 1991; excluding individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) and 401  (k) balances the median was only $3,000. 
Mean values are substantially higher. Almost 20 percent of families had no 
financial assets at all. In  199  1, the median value of  the future social security 
benefits of retired families with heads aged 65-70  was about $100,000, the 
median value of housing was about $50,000, and the median value of future 
employer-provided pension benefits was about $16,000. But other than social 
security and pension benefits, and illiquid housing wealth, the typical family 
has very limited resources to meet unforeseen expenses. 
Two saving programs introduced in the early 1980s  were intended to encour- 
age individual saving. IRAs rapidly became a very popular form of  saving in 
the United States after they became available to all employees in  1982. Any 
employee could contribute $2,000 per year to an IRA and a nonworking spouse 
could contribute $250. The contribution was tax deductible. Annual contribu- 
tions grew from about $5 billion in 1981 to about $38 billion in 1986, approx- 
imately 30 percent  of total personal  saving. Contributions  declined precipi- 
James M. Poterba is professor of  economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
director of the Public Economics Research Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Steven F.  Venti is professor of economics at Dartmouth College and a research associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Wise is the John F.  Stambaugh Professor of 
Political Economy at the John F.  Kennedy School of  Government, Harvard University, and the 
director for Health and Retirement Programs at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
This research was supported primarily by a series of grants from the National Institute on Aging. 
The authors also acknowledge the support of the Hoover Institution (Wise), the National Science 
Foundation (Poterba), and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors are grateful 
to Bill Gale, Jon Gruber, Jon Skinner, and Richard Thaler for comments on an earlier draft of 
the paper. 
23 24  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
tously after the Tax Reform Act of  1986, even though the legislation limited 
the tax deductibility of contributions only for families who had annual incomes 
over $40,000 and who were covered by an employer-provided  pension plan. 
By 1994, only $7.7 billion was contributed to IRAs, and while over 15 percent 
of tax filers contributed in 1986, less than 4 percent contributed in 1994. 
The other program, the 401(k) plan,  grew continuously and almost unno- 
ticed, with contributions increasing from virtually zero at the beginning of the 
decade to over $51 billion by  1991, when almost 25 percent of families con- 
tributed to a 401(k). Deposits in 401(k) accounts are also tax deductible, and 
the return  on the  contributions  accrues  tax  free; taxes are paid  upon  with- 
drawal. But these plans are available only to employees of firms that offer such 
plans. Prior to 1987 the employee contribution limit was $30,000, but the Tax 
Reform Act  of  1986 reduced the limit  to $7,000 and indexed this limit  for 
inflation in subsequent years. The contribution limit was $9,235 for both the 
1994 and 1995 tax years. 
Although very small at the beginning of the decade, by  1989 contributions 
to all personal retirement saving plans exceeded contributions to traditional 
employer-provided pension plans, as shown in figure 1.1. It seems evident that 
were it not for the Tax Reform Act of  1986, personal retirement plan saving 
would have been much larger. Whether these programs increase net saving can 
be of critical importance to future generations of older Americans and to the 
health of the economy in general. The issue remains an important question of 
economic debate. In  a series of  papers based  on very  different methods  of 
analysis we have concluded that a large fraction of the contributions to these 
accounts represent  new  saving. Our previous  research  is  summarized  here, 
along with several new results. 
As interest in the saving effect of these programs evolved, several other in- 
vestigators also directed attention to the issue. In some instances, alternative 
analyses  came to conclusions that differed dramatically  from ours. Thus in 
describing our results we have tried to point out the differences between our 
methods and alternative approaches that have been used to address the same 
questions. We have not, however, attempted to comment on all analyses of the 
relationship between retirement plan saving and total personal saving. 
The key impediment to determining the saving effect of IRAs and 401(k)s 
is saver heterogeneity. Some people save and others do not, and the savers tend 
to save more in all forms. For example, families with IRAs also have more 
conventional  savings than families without IRAs. Thus a continuing goal of 
our analyses has been to consider different methods of controlling for hetero- 
geneity. The methods that could be used when each analysis was conducted 
were largely dependent on the available data. As new data became available we 
used alternative and possibly more robust methods to control for heterogeneity. 
The paper has several sections: Sections 1.1 through 1.5 present our results 
and are organized by the method used to control for heterogeneity. In each case 
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Fig. 1.1  Retirement plan contributions 
tional financial asset saving. These sections also contain some discussion of 
closely related results reported by others. While early work in this area focused 
on the potential  substitution between  IRA assets and liquid financial assets, 
subsequent analyses considered the potential substitution between personal re- 
tirement saving plan assets and employer-provided pension assets and housing 
equity. Section  1.6 considers others margins of substitution, particularly  the 
possibility  that saving in these programs is financed by drawing down home 
equity. Section 1.7 addresses the divergence between our conclusions based on 
Survey of Consumer Finances 1983-86  summary data-introduced  in section 
1.2-and  the parametric analysis of the same data by Gale and Scholz (1994). 
Conclusions are presented in section 1.8. 
1.1  Early Parametric Analysis of Substitution at the Outset 
of the IRA Program 
When Venti and Wise began work on the saving effect of IRAs in the mid- 
1980s, data on asset holdings were available for a limited time period. Assets 
could typically be measured at only two points in time, one year apart. To use 
these data, Venti and Wise developed an econometric model that could be used 
to estimate the relationship between  IRA saving and other saving. Within a 
framework that allowed for any degree of substitution between IRA and non- 
IRA saving, the analysis asked whether persons who save more in IRAs in a 
particular  year  save less  in other financial  asset  forms, controlling for age, 26  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
income, other personal characteristics, and accumulated housing and financial 
assets. Given age and income, this approach used accumulated financial assets 
to control for “individual-specific’’ saving effects. The analysis accounted for 
the explicit limit on IRA contributions and placed substantial emphasis on the 
change in non-IRA saving after the IRA limit is reached. 
The first results using this approach were based on data from the 1983 Sur- 
vey of Consumer Finances (Venti and Wise  1986, 1987; Wise  1987). Subse- 
quent  analysis was  based  on  the  1980-85  Consumer  Expenditure  Surveys 
(Venti and Wise 1990) and the  1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Pro- 
gram Participation (Venti and Wise 1991).’ 
The results suggested that the majority of IRA saving, even at the outset of 
the program, represented net new saving and was not accompanied by substan- 
tial reduction in other financial asset saving. These findings imply that increas- 
ing the IRA limit would lead to substantial increases in IRA saving and very 
little reduction in other saving. If  the IRA limit were raised, one-half to two- 
thirds of the increase in IRA saving would be funded by a decrease in current 
consumption and about one-third by reduced taxes; only a very small propor- 
tion-at  most 20 percent-would  come from other saving. 
The widely cited study by Gale and Scholz (1994), based on the  1983-86 
Survey of Consumer Finances, was in some respects in the same spirit as these 
analyses, but their conclusions were radically different, suggesting that raising 
the IRA limit would have virtually no effect on total personal saving. A detailed 
analysis of the findings in this study is presented in section 1.7 of this paper. 
Our subsequent analyses have taken a very different turn, using better data 
and more robust methods to control for heterogeneity. Our findings based on 
these approaches are discussed in the next four sections. 
1.2  Following Individuals over Time at the Outset of the IRA Program 
To  frame the discussion in this and subsequent sections, we give a simple 
algebraic description of the key features of each method that we use to control 
for heterogeneity. We establish some notation and key ideas at the outset. Con- 
sider the flow of saving Sz,  of person i in year t. To capture saving heterogeneity 
among families, suppose that saving of person  i depends on an  unobserved 
individual-specific  saving effect m,.  This effect is large for more committed 
savers and small for less eager savers. Saving may also depend on a program 
effect, which is denoted by p,,.  For program participants, p,,  is the component 
of saving that is due to the program; for nonparticipants, p,,  is zero. If person  i 
1. In an earlier study, Hubbard (1984) found that the ratio of assets to income was higher for 
IRA participants, controlling for individual attributes and eligibility. He concluded that the results 
“provide strong evidence that contributions to IRAs and Keogh plans do increase individual sav- 
ing.” Feenberg and Skinner (1989) show that IRA participants save mare than nonparticipants, 
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is a saving program participant and person j is a nonparticipant, S,, = m,  + p,, 
and SJt = mJ.  The difference in saving between these individuals is 
This difference confounds the program effect with the difference in the taste 
for saving. 
In this simple example the difference in saving rates between participants 
and nonparticipants does not provide an unbiased estimate of the program ef- 
fect because the unobserved taste for saving is correlated with program partici- 
pation. This form of  heterogeneity  is probably the most important source of 
potential bias, but there are others as well. In the following sections we present 
several methods to control for heterogeneity. Each method controls for impor- 
tant sources of heterogeneity, but no single method-other  than a randomized 
controlled trial-can  control for all possible sources. Each of the methods in 
this and the following sections is described in a consistent way, in an attempt 
to highlight both the way that heterogeneity is addressed as well as the potential 
types of heterogeneity  that each method may not address. A specific form of 
heterogeneity that may confound an estimate obtained by one method may not 
present the same problem within the context of another method. Thus there is 
an important advantage to using several methods to address potential heteroge- 
neity. 
In practice, each estimate is a difference obtained in  one of three  ways: 
(1) by comparing the saving or assets of a “treatment” group in a later period 
with saving or assets of the same group in an earlier period, relying on within- 
group changes; (2)  by comparing saving or assets of two different groups in 
the same period, relying on between-group comparisons; or (3) by comparing 
the assets at a given age of persons who attain that age in different calendar 
years, using “cohort analysis.” 
1.2.1 
The Method 
Change in Other Saving When IRA Status Changes 
The most direct way to control for heterogeneity is to follow the same house- 
hold  over  time,  observing  the  change  in  S,[ when  program  participation 
changes. Saving in periods t and t+ 1 for household i can be described by 
$,  = mr  + P,[7 
S,t+l = m,  + PV+l ‘ 
The “within-household” change in saving is therefore 
(2)  st+,  - s, = (m,  - 4)  + (P,,+,  -  Pit) = P,t+I -  P!,  9 28  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
which yields an estimate of the program effect for households that participate 
in one period but not in the other (ptr  is zero in the nonparticipating period). 
The unobserved individual-specific saving effects are "differenced" out. 
If the heterogeneity is limited to differences in saving commitment among 
households, and the problem is simply that more committed  savers are more 
likely to be program participants, then this within-household change in saving 
provides a clean estimate of the program effect. But this estimate can be con- 
founded  by  another possible  source of  heterogeneity:  differences  in  saving 
commitment over time within the same household. If individual saving com- 
mitment changes at the same time that participation  status changes, this esti- 
mate will capture the effect of a change in the taste for saving as well as the 
participation effect. With this coincidence, the difference would be 
(3) 
If the household began to participate in period t+l at the same time that the 
unobserved propensity to save increased, the difference in saving would over- 
estimate the program effect. 
The Results 
Venti and Wise (199Sa) used this method in analyzing data from consecutive 
waves of  the  1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The 
SIPP panel data allow calculation of the change in non-IRA saving when IRA 
contributor  status changes,  although non-IRA  saving must be inferred from 
asset income. They considered  the change in non-IRA  saving between  1984 
and 1985 by IRA contributor status.* If non-IRA saving is reduced when IRA 
saving is increased, then when a household that was not contributing begins to 
contribute, that household should reduce its non-IRA saving. Likewise, when 
a household that was contributing stops contributing, non-IRA saving should 
increase. Venti and Wise find, however, that when the same families are tracked 
over time, there is little change in other financial asset saving when families 
begin to contribute to an IRA, or when they stop contributing. Illustrative re- 
sults are shown in table 1.1. 
These data reveal little substitution. The key information in this approach is 
the change in other financial assets when families began to contribute to an 
IRA. In particular, the non-IRA financial asset saving of families that did not 
contribute in 1984 but did contribute in  1985 declined by only $193 between 
1984 and  198S.3  This decline in other saving is only a small fraction of the 
increase in saving from the typical family IRA contribution,  $2,300. These 
2. Non-IRA saving is inferred from capitalized asset income at three points in time, measured 
in  current-year dollars.  Non-IRA  assets include  all  interest-bearing  financial assets  including 
stocks and bonds. 
3. If the underlying assets are measured in constant dollars, instead of current-year dollars, the 
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Table 1.1  Change in Non-IRA Saving When IRA Contributor Status Changed 
between 1984 and 1985 
1985  1985 
Noncontributor  Contributor 
1984 Noncontributor  89.4  -193.5 
1984 Contributor  630.3  186.2 
( 102.1)  (413.6) 
(527.2)  (303.9) 
F = 0.698 
Source: Venti and Wise (1995a). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
data suggest that even near the outset of  the IRA program there was only a 
small reduction in non-IRA saving when IRA contributions began.4 
As  emphasized  above,  this  procedure  does  not  correct  for  “within- 
individual” change in saving behavior. For example, suppose that the saving 
behavior of persons who began to contribute in  1985 changed between  1984 
and  1985 and that this change happened to coincide with the newly available 
IRA option. If the IRA option had not been available, it could be argued, the 
person would have saved in the non-IRA form, but since it was available, the 
newly awakened  saver stored assets in the more advantageous IRA instead. 
The alternative, of course, is that the IRA option induced the person to save in 
that form and that the new IRA contribution would not have been  saved in 
another form. To us, the results seem more consistent with the conclusion that 
the two forms of saving are largely independent, with changes in IRA saving 
having little effect on other saving. It is clear that those who began to contrib- 
ute in  1985 had not been saving $2,300 annually prior to 1984. Indeed, their 
estimated asset balance in 1984 was only $3,362. The same is true for persons 
who had contributed to an IRA in 1984 but quit contributing in  1985; their 
1984 balance was $4,816. 
It is nonetheless possible that individual behavior could have changed over 
time, and the method used here cannot formally correct for this. The cohort 
analysis discussed below, however, accounts for this possibility, and the results 
are consistent with the conclusions drawn here. 
1.2.2  Attanasio and De Leire’s Study of “Old” versus “New” Contributors 
Attanasio and De Leire (1994; hereafter AD) analyze Consumer Expendi- 
ture Survey (CES) data to evaluate the  substitution between IRA and other 
4. The increase of  $630.3 when contributions are curtailed also suggests some substitution as 
well, although the estimate is not significantly different from zero. Again, the amount is much less 
than the typical family IRA contribution. Asset balances are measured in May of each year because 
IRA contributions can be made through the 15 April tax-filing deadline. 30  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
financial assets. The CES data essentially provide a series of independent cross 
sections, but each cross section is in fact a short panel, providing asset balances 
at two points in time, one year apart. AD consider the difference between the 
annual non-IRA saving-measured  by the change in asset balances-of  “old” 
and “new” contributors. In a given year, old contributors are families that con- 
tributed in the previous year (and possibly earlier years as well); new contribu- 
tors are those who did not contribute in the previous year. Within a regression 
framework, they find that old contributors save $1,740 more than new contrib- 
utors. 
At first blush, the results may appear to contradict  the evidence just pre- 
sented. On closer inspection, however, the method used by AD-the  compari- 
son of  new contributors with old contributors-can  say very little about the 
saving effect of the IRA program. Indeed, if taken at face value, the AD result 
suggests that in the$rst year that an IRA contribution is made, there is a drop 
in non-IRA financial assets, but in the next year and in future years when the 
household continues to contribute, other saving reverts to its pre-IRA level. So 
in the long run there is essentially no offser of  IRA saving by  a reduction  in 
other saving.s 
The key features of the AD method are shown in Figures 1.2A through 1.2C. 
These illustrative figures assume that old contributors start to make IRA contri- 
butions in the 1982-83  period and that new contributors start to contribute in 
the  1983-84  period, that both old and new contributors save $2,000 per year 
in the absence of the IRA, and that an IRA contribution is $2,000. The figures 
compare the other saving of old and new contributors in the 1983-84  period. 
Figure 1.U illustrates the situation when there is no substitution at all. Other 
saving remains at $2,000 when IRA contributions begin. When the new con- 
tributors begin to contribute, there is no difference in the other saving of  old 
and new contributors. Figure 1.2B illustrates the situation when there is com- 
plete substitution. When the old contributors  begin to contribute, their other 
saving falls from $2,000 to zero and remains at zero thereafter. When the new 
contributors begin to contribute one year later, their other saving also falls from 
$2,000 to zero. When the two groups are compared in 1983-84,  saving is zero 
for both groups. Like the no substitution case, there is no difference in the other 
saving of new and old contributors. Thus the value computed by AD cannot 
distinguish between the two polar cases of  no substitution and complete substi- 
tution. 
Neither of the processes illustrated in figures  1.2A  or 1.2B are consistent 
with the difference between the saving of old and new contributors that AD 
find.  Figure  1.2C illustrates  a  process  that  is consistent  with  their  finding. 
When old contributors first contribute, their other saving falls from $2,000 to 
zero. But in the next year other saving reverts to the previous level of $2,000. 
In this year, new contributors begin to contribute, and their other saving falls 
5.  A similar point is made by Hubbard and Skinner (1995). A  3000 I--- 
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Table 1.2  Inferred Non-IRA Financial Asset Balances in 1984, 1985, and 1986, 
by Asset and by Change in IRA Contributor Status between 1984 and 
1985 (in current dollars) 
1985 IRA = 0  1985 IRA > 0 
May  May  May  May  May  May 
1984  1985  1986  1984  1985  I986 
1984 IRA = 0  1,210  1,587  2,053  3,362  5,051  6,546 
(98)  (98)  (98)  (399)  (399)  (399) 
I984 IRA 10  4,816  5,896  7,606  7,457  9,659  12,048 
(509)  (509)  (509)  (293)  (293)  (293) 
R2 = 0.212  F = 434.60 
Source: Venti and Wise (199%). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
from $2,000 to zero. The difference between the other saving of old and new 
contributors is $2,000 in this year, approximately AD’S finding. The next year, 
however, new contributors become old contributors, and their other saving re- 
verts to its previous level of  $2,000. There is a one-year reduction in other 
saving but no offset thereafter, and thus little substitution in the long run. 
More detail on the non-IRA saving of households who do and do not change 
IRA status helps to show the limitations  of  the AD method.  The asset data 
from which the numbers in table 1.1 were derived are shown in table 1.2.h  For 
example, the change in the other saving of persons who began to contribute to 
an IRA in 1985 is derived from the three asset levels in the upper right comer 
of table 1.2 ((6,546 -  5,051) -  (5,051 -  3,362) = -  193.5). Two things are 
clear from these data: First, the assets of old contributors-in  the lower right 
corner-are  substantially greater than the assets of new contributors-in  the 
upper right. Their annual saving is different as well-about  $1,600 for new 
contributors, about $2,300 for old contributors. Second, there was little change 
in the other saving behavior of either group over the two-year period, -  193.5 
for new contributors and +186.2 for old contributors. Looking at these data, 
however, the method used by AD would show a difference between the non- 
IRA financial assets of old and new contributors of  -$894  in 1985 ((6,546 - 
5,051) -  (12,048 -  9,659) = -894),  which bears no particular relationship 
to substitution. 
1.2.3  Joines and Manegolds Analysis of Saving Change When the IRA 
Limit Increases 
Joines and Manegold (1995) use the “change” in IRA contribution limits 
determined by the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of  198  1 to estimate the 
6. These asset levels are inferred  from asset earnings reported in SIPP at three points in time, 
approximately one year apart. Inferred assets based on alternative methods are presented in Venti 
and Wise (1995a). Although  the asset levels differ by method and the growth in assets differs as 
well, the basic difference-in-difference results, as in table 1.1, are very similar. 33  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
saving effect of the IRA program. Prior to ERTA, only wage earners without an 
employer-provided  pension plan were eligible to contribute to  an IRA. The 
contribution limit for wage earners in this group was $1,500. ERTA extended 
eligibility to all wage earners, beginning in  1982, and increased the limit for 
each wage earner to $2,000. In addition, nonworking spouses of wage earners 
could contribute $250. 
Joines and Manegold consider the change in the total annualjnancial asset 
saving of contributor households between the  1979-81  and 1982-85  periods 
as a function of the change in the IRA  limit between these time periods. Their 
analysis is based on a panel of individual tax returns. Saving in each period is 
determined by the change during the period in total financial assets, which are 
estimated by capitalizing reported asset income. Two groups of households are 
considered: “new” contributor households first contributed at some time in the 
later (1  982-85)  period, and “continuing”  contributor households contributed 
in both the earlier and later periods. The “change” in the limit for new contribu- 
tors was from zero to $2,000, $2,250, or $4,000 for single wage earner fami- 
lies, couples with a single wage earner, and two wage earner families, respec- 
tively. The limit change for continuing contributors was from $1,500 to $2,000 
for single wage earners, from $1,500 to $2,250 for couples with a single wage 
earner, and from $3,000 to $4,000 for two wage earner couples. 
(4)  Saving,,-,,  - Saving,,-,,  =  p(X)  * (Limit change)  + yX, 
where the key parameter p is the relationship between the limit change and the 
change in saving. In some specifications p is estimated as a single parameter; 
in others it is a function of a vector of covariates X,  describing primarily house- 
hold tax status.,  The covariates also enter separately, with coefficient y. The 
parameter p is not the saving effect of IRA contributions. It does not represent 
the relationship between IRA contributions and saving but rather the relation- 
ship between saving and the change in the IRA limit. Thus it is not comparable 
to most other estimates discussed in this paper, which consider the proportion 
of contributions that represent new saving. For example, suppose that a single 
new contributor deposited $1,000 in an IRA. If the $1,000 were entirely new 
saving, p would be 0.50 (1,000/2,000), not  1.00. If the $1,000 were the only 
deposit of a single wage earner couple, p would be 0.44 (1,000/2,250). If the 
$1,000 were the only deposit of  a two wage earner family, p would be 0.25 
( 1,000/4,000).8 
Joines and Manegold estimate a relationship of the form 
7. The variables include a mortgage deduction indicator, number of  exemptions, marital status, 
the first-dollar marginal tax rate, gender, and transitory income (measured by the mean deviation 
of income from average income over the 1979-86  period). 
8. Although Joines and Manegold compare their estimates to those of Venti and Wise (1986, 
1987, 1990, 1991) and Gale and Scholz (1994), their comparisons are inappropriate. Venti and 
Wise consider the proportion of  IRA contributions that represent new saving, and to indicate the 
implications of the results, they simulate the proportion of the increase in IRA contributions re- 
sulringfrom an increase in the limit that would be new saving. Gale and Scholz direct their analysis 
to this proportion as well, as discussed in section 1.7 below. 34  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
When p is estimated as a single parameter,  Joines and Manegold obtain 
values ranging from 0.17 to 0.73, depending on the method of estimation. The 
largest estimate is obtained by ordinary least squares and is very imprecise. 
Joines and Manegold favor robust least squares estimates, with p parameter- 
ized as a function of X.  Their “best guess” estimate of f3  is 0.26. This implies 
that substantially more than  26 percent of  the  IRA contributions  associated 
with an increase in the limit would represent new saving. 
Joines and Manegold find that the median of estimated total financial assets 
of new contributors was only $4,396 in the 1979-81  period. The typical IRA 
contribution in the 1982-85  period was about $2,300. Since most contributors 
in this period were new contributors, the typical contribution of new contribu- 
tors was clearly much greater than these new contributors had  been  accus- 
tomed to saving prior to the advent of  the IRA program. Thus, although the 
analysis does not purport to estimate the net saving effect of IRA contributions, 
the Joines and Manegold summary data suggest that the saving effect is likely 
to have been substantial. 
1.2.4 
The Method 
We now consider the change in non-IRA saving of IRA contributors as their 
IRA savings accumulate. The specification above relates saving in year t to an 
individual-specific taste effect m,  and a program effectp,. Most surveys do not 
obtain direct measures of  saving, however, but instead collect information on 
asset balances; saving must be estimated from changes in the balances. Since 
asset  balances  reflect  the  accumulation  of  past  saving  decisions,  they  also 
reflect  individual-specific  saving  effects.  Suppose an  IRA  contributor  with 
individual-specific component m,  has been saving for s years and has partici- 
pated in a retirement saving program for n of these years. Then the household‘s 
asset balance, after s years of saving and n years of program saving, is 
Analyzing the Change in the Assets of IRA Contributors 
(5)  ATt(n)  = (1  + r)’A,, + m,[(l + r)’ - l)]/r + p,[(l + r)” - l)]/r 
where A, is the level of assets when saving began (possibly zero), r is the rate 
of  return, and h(.),  f(.),  and g(.) are defined by context. This very  stylized 
formulation need not be interpreted literally and indeed does not reflect saving 
behavior that might limit  accumulation to some precautionary level, for ex- 
ample. Here the formulation simply serves to emphasize that the program ef- 
fect as well  as the individual saving effect are magnified by the number  of 
years over which saving occurs. To illustrate the key features of this and other 
methods, we write the relationship in the simplified form, highlighting the key 
parameters in boldface. 
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Table 1.3  Survey of Consumer Finances Data Summary (in current dollars) 
Year 
Percentage 
Contributor Status and Asset  1983  1986  Change 
Contributors in  1986 
Non-IRA assets  9,400  13,500  43.6 
IRA assets  1,000  7,000  600.0 
Total assets  12,075  24,000  98.8 
Total assets  729  1,000  37.2 
Noncontributors in 1986 
again after n+k years of exposure. After n+k years of  program saving, and 
s+k years of  nonprogram saving, the assets of participants will be 
The change in assets over the k years is given by 
If A,  = 0, this expression becomes 
The change in assets reflects the program effect plus the saving that mt  type 
families would have done over k years in the absence of the program. To isolate 
the program effect, we use cross-sectional data at the earliest observation date 
to approximate m,[f(s+k)  -f(s)], the expected change in saving over the next 
k years in the absence of the IRA program. We then compare this estimate with 
the actual change in assets for IRA contributors. 
The Results 
Using 1983 and 1986 Survey of  Consumer Finances (SCF) data it is possible 
to compare the asset balances of the same households over time. Venti and 
Wise (1992) considered how the assets of IRA contributors changed over this 
time period. The results are reported in table 1.3. Households that made IRA 
contributions over this period began the period with a median of $9,400 in 
other financial assets in 1983. Between 1983 and 1986, the IRA assets of these 
families  increased  from $1,000  to  $7,000. Other financial assets  increased 
from $9,400 to $13,500. These families ended the period with total financial 
assets, including IRAs, of  $24,000, an increase of 100 percent over assets in 
1983. Venti and Wise determined that an increase of this magnitude could not 
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1986.9 In particular, they find that the increase in other financial assets is no 
less than would have been expected in the absence of the IRA program. Thus 
they conclude that it is unlikely that the IRA contributions simply substituted 
for saving that would have occurred anyway. 
Once again, however, it is possible that at least some IRA contributors expe- 
rienced a shift in saving commitment that happened to coincide with the emer- 
gence of the IRA option and that the new commitment to saving was realized 
through contributions to an IRA instead of contributions to conventional saving 
accounts. But for the results to be explained by a within-household change in 
saving behavior  would require that most IRA  contributors over the  1983-86 
period had not been committed savers prior to this period (to be consistent with 
the low  1983 asset balances)  but became committed  savers just as the IRA 
program became available  and would  have become committed  savers in the 
absence of the program. This seems to us an unlikely coincidence of events.“’ 
The numbers in table 1.3  come from the same data used by Gale and Scholz 
(1994) in their analysis of the saving effect of the IRA program. In section 1.7 
below we return to consideration  of their methodology  and how the conclu- 
sions of their formal analysis could be so different from what we believe these 
simple data suggest. 
1.3  Comparing the Assets of “Like” Saver Groups Over Time 
1.3.  I  Within-Group Comparisons 
The Method 
Each of the foregoing methods rests on comparing the same individuals over 
time, so that similar saving propensities can be “differenced out.” Another way 
to eliminate the unobserved saving effect is to group households with similar 
saving propensities and then estimate the program effect by using the within- 
group difference  in exposure to retirement  saving programs.  Poterba, Venti, 
and Wise (PVW 1994a, 1995) use saving program participation itself as a sig- 
nal of taste for saving. “Like saver” groups are determined by observed saving 
behavior:  families participating in an IRA only are one group, families who 
participate in both an IRA and a 401(k) are another, and so forth. 
9. Prediction of  the expected increase in non-IRA saving in the absence of  the program is dis- 
cussed in section  I .7 below. 
10. The test reported in Venti and Wise (1990) provides more formal evidence against the co- 
incidence hypothesis. Unlike the SCF data that pertain to the same households in 1983 and 1986, 
the CES data used in the Venti and Wise (1990) analysis is based on random samples of similar 
households for the period 1980-85. E.g., the 1980 survey respondents were about the same age as 
the 1985 respondents. If the saving behavior of contributors changed just as the IRA program was 
introduced, estimates of saving based on post-1982 data should predict pre-1982 saving poorly. 
But the formal model estimated on post-1982 data predicts well the pattern of  saving by  income 
in the pre-1982 period, prior to the advent of  IRAs.  If the saving behavior of  contributors had 
changed dramatically over this time period, one would expect a poor match between actual and 
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We consider the within-group difference between the assets of a like group 
at two points  in time, but  we  do not  compare the same  households  in two 
periods. Rather the groups are obtained from random cross sections of house- 
holds surveyed in different calendar years. Because the cross-sectional surveys 
are representative, the demographic attributes of the cross sections are approxi- 
mately the same each year. The like saver groups will be the same if households 
that save in a given way in one year are like the households that save in that 
way in another year. The hope is that two randomly chosen cross sections from 
the same like group share the same unobserved saving propensities  and thus 
would  have the same asset balances,  except for differential  exposure to the 
special  saving programs,  which  identifies the program  effect.  Families  ob- 
served in  1984 had had about two years of  exposure to the IRA and 401(k) 
programs, families observed in 1987 about five years of exposure, and families 
in 1991 about nine years. 
Two factors may complicate this analysis of the effect of program exposure. 
First, although the IRA program expanded rapidly between 1982 and 1986, the 
Tax Reform Act of  1986 reduced the attraction of IRAs for households with 
incomes above $30,000 and led to a massive reduction in IRA participation by 
households at all income levels, even those who were unaffected by the legisla- 
tion. There were few new contributors after 1986. Second, the 401(k) program 
grew rapidly throughout the  1980s, with more and more firms offering such 
plans. In both cases, but especially with respect to IRAs, the characteristics- 
and thus the saving commitment-of  participants may have changed over time. 
In principle, there could also be year-specific macroeffects  that might affect 
saving of  both  program participants and nonparticipants.  (The results below 
show no effects for nonparticipants.) 
Now  consider explicitly  the assets of  a like saver group surveyed in two 
different randomly selected cross sections, conducted k years apart. The two 
random samples of a particular group have been saving in any form for approx- 
imately the same number of years s,  but the sample surveyed in the earlier year 
has had n years of exposure to the program and the sample surveyed in the later 
year has had n +  k years of exposure. (It is not important that s be known, but only 
that s be the same for each random cross section.) Assume that m,  is the typical 
saving propensity of the sample surveyed at the later date and that m,,  is the typi- 
cal saving propensity of the sample surveyed at the earlier date. Then 
A.(n)  = h(s) + m,m  + p2g(n), 
AS#b  + k) = h(s) + m,f(s)  + p,g@ + k). 
This implies 
If m,  = m,,,  then the difference in assets of the two random samples represents 
the program effect. If mt # m,.,  then the difference represents a combination 
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If, as seems likely, less committed  savers are drawn into the  program  as it 
matures, then m,  <  m,.,  and the first term is negative. In this case, the direction 
of  the  “bias”  is  clear; the  difference  in assets underestimates  the  program 
effect.” 
Results 
PVW  (1994a,  1995) used  several  saving  choices  to  identify  like  saver 
groups. We grouped families in two ways: first, according to whether they con- 
tributed to an IRA, a 401(k), or both; and second, according to whether they 
were eligible for a 401(k) plan and whether they had an IRA. Altogether, we 
considered six different groups of  “saver types,” not counting those without 
IRA or 401(k) saving. We  focused on the within-group change in the other 
saving of families in these groups using data from the SIPP for 1984, 1987, 
and 1991. Random samples of  saver types are similar in each of these years, 
but  the  1984 sample had had  only about two years  (1982-84)  to accumu- 
late 401(k) and IRA balances, the 1987 sample about five years, and the 1991 
sample about nine years. The central question is whether longer exposure to 
these plans results  in higher levels of saving by families who participate in 
the programs. 
The key test for substitution is whether non-IRA-401 (k) assets are lower for 
the random samples that had been exposed to the IRA and 401(k) programs 
for longer periods of  time and that had accumulated more IRA  and 401(k) 
assets. The answer is typically no. The data for six saver groups are shown in 
table 1.4 (abstracted from PVW 1995).  The key finding is that, with one partial 
exception, within each saver group the level of other financial assets for the 
1991 sample is not noticeably lower than the level of other financial assets for 
the 1987 and 1984 samples. Indeed, within each saver group, the level of total 
financial assets for the 1991 sample exceeds the level for the 1987 sample (the 
total is not available for 1984 because 401(k) assets were not obtained in that 
year). The only apparent aberration is a decline in the median of other financial 
assets of 40l(k)-only savers between 1984 and 1987. For this group, there was 
a noticeable increase in total financial assets, but little change in non-40l(k) 
assets, between 1987 and 1991. But there was a noticeable increase in the total 
assets of families who made IRA and 401(k) contributions or were eligible for 
a 401(k) (whether or not they had an IRA). Since there is no evidence of  a 
reduction in other assets for any of these groups, we conclude that the increase 
in retirement plan assets was not funded by a reduction in other financial assets. 
Consider, for example, families with an IRA only (group 2a). A comparison 
of the 1984 and 1991 samples reveals that the median total financial assets of 
such families increased from $19,068 to $23,892. But there was little change 
in other financial assets, which declined from $1 1,595 to $10,717. Or consider 
families  with  an  IRA  who  were  eligible  for a 401(k) (group  5a). Because 
11. This is what Bernheim (1994) refers to as the “dilution effect.” Table 1.4  Conditional Median Assets by Saver Group, 1984,1987, and 1991 
(in 1987 dollars) 
Saver Group and Asset Category  1984  1987  1991 
By IRA-40l(k) Saver Group 
I'M and./ui'('& 
la.  Families with IRA and 401(k) 
Total financial assets  - 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  15,653 
Total financial assets  1,060 
Ib. Families with neither IRA nor 401(k) 
IRA Only 
2a.  Families with IRA only 
Total Financial Assets  19,068 
Other than IRA  11,595 
Total financial assets  1,214 
Other than 40 I (k)  1,180 
2b.  Families without IRA 
401(k)  Only 
3a.  Families with 401(k) only 
Total financial assets  - 
Other than 401(k)  3,723 
Total financial assets  3,570 
Other than IRA  2,472 























By 401(k) Eligibility and IRA Saver Group 
All Families 
4a.  Eligible for a 401(k) 
Total financial assets  -  16,763  19,608 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  6,924  6,796  7,037 
Total financial assets  43  16  4,607  4.573 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  3,075  3,010  3,025 
4b. Not eligible for a 401(k) 
Families with an IRA 
5a.  Eligible for a 401(k) 
Total financial assets  -  37,882  44,432 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  16,881  16,032  17,212 
Total financial assets  20,686  23,531  27,094 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  13,098  13,269  13,355 
5b. Not eligible for a 401(k) 
Families without an IRA 
6a. Eligible for 401(k) 
Total financial assets  -  5,748  7,013 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  2,992  2,737  2,757 
Total financial assets  1,261  1,202  1,210 
6b.  Not eligible for a 401(k) 
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995). 
Nore: The estimates are conditional on age, income, education, and marital status. The medians 
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401(kj asset balances were not reported in 1984, total financial assets are not 
available in that year, but between  1987 and 1991, total financial assets of this 
group increased from $37,882 to $44,432. Yet  there was no decline in other 
financial assets, which increased slightly from $16,881 to $17,212. 
Although the key comparison here is the within-group change over time in 
the other financial assets of persons who participated (or were eligible for) the 
IRA and 401(kj programs, we also show data for families that did not partici- 
pate in one or both of these programs. In each of these groups, except 5b for 
which where was a slight increase, there was a decline in other financial assets 
between  1984 and  1991. For example, the median assets of persons with nei- 
ther an IRA nor a 401(k) declined from $1,060 to $939. The assets of families 
without an IRA and who were not eligible for a 40  1  (k) declined from $1,26  1 
to $1,210. Because the assets of program participants and nonparticipants are 
typically  very  different,  however,  we  avoid between-group  comparisons  of 
these very dissimilar saver groups. Because their saving propensities are appar- 
ently so different, there seems little reason to believe that they would experi- 
ence similar changes in asset balances in the absence of the saving programs. 
We return to this issue below. 
It is sometimes suggested that these programs may affect households with 
limited assets but have little effect on wealthier households. We have addressed 
this issue by comparing the distribution of assets in 1984 and 1991.  Again we 
rely on the fact that households in the  1991 survey had had much more time 
than their counterparts in earlier years to contribute to the saving programs. As 
shown in PVW (1994bj, the higher levels of total financial assets held by IRA 
and 401(k) participant families in 1991 was not limited to families with large 
or small asset balances. Rather the effect was evident across the entire distribu- 
tion of households, from those with the least to those with the greatest assets. 
On the other hand, across the entire distribution, there was almost no change 
between  1984 and  1991 in the non-IRA40l(k)  assets of  contributors. At all 
points in the distribution there was a fall over time in the assets of noncontrib- 
utors. 
For these estimates to control for heterogeneity, it is important that the typi- 
cal person within a like saver group not change substantially over time-that 
is, that the unobserved difference in saving propensity m,  -  m,,  be close to 
zero. To  help to assure that this is true, we have controlled for age, income, 
education, and marital status in calculating all the numbers presented in table 
1.4. Nonetheless, it is possible that there were changes not accounted for by 
these covariates. 
1.3.2  Engen, Gale, and Scholz Between-Group Comparisons 
The Method 
The critical feature of the PVW like group comparison is the within-group 
change  in other assets as the retirement  assets of  a group  accumulate with 
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the  group-specific  saving effect. Engen,  Gale, and  Scholz  (1994; hereafter 
EGS) follow a very different between-group approach and present an alterna- 
tive comparison as evidence of substitution between retirement saving program 
assets and other saving. EGS combine two of the PVW like groups, and they 
compare the assets of the combined group to the assets of another of the PVW 
like saver groups. Using a difference-in-difference approach, EGS compare the 
change in the assets of two very different saver groups. The first group-call 
it the  “treatment” group-is  composed  of  all 401(k) participants. This is a 
composite group, some of  whom participate only in the 401(k) program and 
some of whom participate in both the 401(k) and the IRA programs. Assume 
that this composite program effect is cp,  and that members of this group have 
saving commitment m,  in the most recent year and m,,  in the earlier year. The 
difference in the assets of  two random samples of group  i surveyed k  years 
apart is given by 
As,(n+k) -  A,W = (m, -  m,om  + cp,[g(n+k) - &)I. 
The EGS second group is composed of IRA participants not eligible for a 
401(k) and is thus exposed only to the IRA program, with an IRA program 
effect denoted by 6,. Let m, represent the saving commitment of  the second 
group in the most recent period and mi  the saving commitment of this group 
in the earlier period. Then the difference in assets of two random samples of 
group j surveyed k years apart is 
As,@  + k) -  A*,(n)  = (m, - m,,)f(s)  + b,k(n +  k) - 
The difference-in-difference estimate used by EGS is 
(8)  [As,@  +  k) -  A,(n)l - [A3,(n  +  k) -  A,(n)l 
= [(m, -  m,J - (m, - m,JIf(s) + (CP, - b,)[g(n+k)  -  &)I. 
In principle, this method will estimate the program effect if m, = m, and m, = 
m, ,  or if mt -  m,.  = m, -  m,,,  but there are several confounding effects. First, 
the estimate is the difference (cp, -  b,) between the composite group (IRA and 
401  (k)) program effect and the IRA program effect. Second, the program effect 
is assumed to be the same for both groups, but it is likely that the same program 
will  have different effects  on very  dissimilar  saver groups, even  without  a 
within-group change in saving propensity. Third, because IRA participants are 
a much  more select  group of  savers than 401(k)  participants,  the between- 
group difference in the saving commitments of the composite group and the 
IRA group at a point in time (m, -  m, or m, -  m,,)  may be very large.’*  Thus 
there is reason to question whether the within-group change in saving commit- 
ments will be the same for both groups. 
In the EGS case, the within-group change in saving commitment (m, -  m,.) 
12. The IRA participation rate never exceeded 16 percent; the 401(k) participation rate has been 
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of the composite group is especially large. The two subgroups of the composite 
group have very different saving commitments. And the subgroup proportions 
in the composite group change over time. There is a substantially smaller pro- 
portion of committed savers and a larger proportion of less committed savers 
in the most recent year. Thus m,  is much less than mi.. 
Comparison of Results 
Our reproduction  of the central EGS results is reported in the top panel of 
table  1.5. EGS compare all participants  in a 401(k) plan-combining  PVW 
groups  la and 3a in table 1.4-with  IRA contributors who were not eligible 
for a 401(k)-PVW  group 5b in table 1.4. EGS interpret the fall in the assets 
of 401(k) participants compared to the increase in the assets of the “control” 
group as evidence that 401(k) contributions did not lead to an increase in fi- 
nancial assets between  1987 and 1991. 
The critical feature of our approach to controlling for heterogeneity  is com- 
parison of the within-group change in non-IRA40l(k)  assets as IRA and or 
401(kj assets grow, for each like saver group. Based on this reasoning, we find 
that  the  EGS comparison  has  two  important  shortcomings.  First,  the  two 
groups EGS compare surely exhibited very different saving behavior before the 
advent of the IRA and 401(kj programs. In 1987, the non-IRA-40l(k)  assets of 
the EGS control group were almost twice as large as those of  the treatment 
group of  401(kj participants ($11,823 vs. $6,635). From table  1.4, it can be 
seen that similar differences existed in 1984. Thus, in our view, the two groups 
should not be treated as like saver groups and the comparison between them is 
not meaningful. 
Furthermore, the increase in the total financial assets of the control group is 
entirely due to the increase in the IRA assets of this group. There was virtually 
no change in the non-IRA assets of this group. This can also be seen in the 
PVW data for group 5b in table 1.4. The non-IRA assets of this group remained 
almost constant, increasing from $13,098 to $13,355 between 1984 and 1987. 
In  arguing that IRA and 401(k) plans  have no effect on personal  saving, it 
seems awkward to use evidence that suggests a substantial effect of IRAs on 
saving to show that the 401(k) plan had no effect. 
The second problem with the EGS comparison is also fundamental and leads 
to an incorrect interpretation of the fall in the assets of the composite 401(k) 
participant group. This group is in fact composed of two very different groups: 
401(k) participants without an IRA and 401(k) participants with an IRA. The 
misleading interpretation created by combining these very different groups can 
be explained with reference to the bottom panel of table 1.5. The 1987 non- 
IRA-40l(kj assets of the second group-40l(kj  participants with an IRA- 
are about  10 times as large as those of the first group-40l(kj  participants 
without  an IRA.I3 It is clear that the past saving behavior of  the two groups 
13. The other financial assets of the “control” group are three or four times as large as the other 
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Table 1.5  EGS Comparison and the Composition Fallacy (in 1991 dollars) 
Percentage 
Saver Group and Asset Category  1987  1991  Change  Change 
EGS Comparison: All 401(k) Participants vs. “Control” Group- 
IRA Participants Not Eligible for a 401(k) 
1.  All 401(k) participants” 
Total financial assets 
Net total financial assetsb 
Other than IRA and 40  1  (k) 
Number 
Percentage of  total 
2.  “Control” group: IRA 
participants not eligible 
for a 40 I (k) 
Total financial assets 
Net total financial assets 
Other than IRA and 401(k) 
20,630  19,300  -  1,330  -6.4 
17,710  15,999  -  1,711  -9.7 
6,635  4,747  -  1,888  -28.5 
1,489  2,773 
100.0  100.0 
24,129  28,974  4,845  20. I 
21,052  26,100  5,048  24.0 
11,823  11,000  -  823  -7.0 
Decomposition of EGS: All 401(k) Participant Group 
3a.  401(k) Participants without 
an IRA 
Total financial assets  8,686  10,000  1,314  15.1 
Net total financial assets  5,550  7,149  1,599  28.8 
Other than 401(k)  2,774  2,400  -374  -  13.5 
Number  780  1,744 
Percentage of  total  52.4  62.9 
3b. 401(k) Participants with 
an IRA 
Total financial assets  44,638  50,275  5,637  12.6 
Net total financial assets  41,622  46,099  4,477  10.8 
Other than IRA or 401(k)  29,844  30,000  156  0.6 
Number  709  850 
Percentage of total  47.6  37.1 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from 1987 and  1991 SIPP. 
‘Group 1 is our reproduction of the EGS numbers. Although the match is not exact, it is very close 
and qualitative relationships are the same. 
bNet  of  nonmortgage debt. 
was very different. This confounds inferences made from changes in the assets 
of the combined group, particularly if the proportions of the two subgroups in 
the composite group change over time, as they do between 1987 and 1991. The 
proportion of the second (high saver) group declined from 47.6 percent to 37.1 
percent of the total combined groups, leading to a fall in the assets of the com- 
behavior of the EGS “control” group does not approximate the saving behavior of either of the 
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posite group. The proportion of the low-saver group increased from 52.4 per- 
cent to 62.9 percent. Thus the non-IRA-40l(k)  assets of the composite group 
declined. In fact, the total assets of each group separately increased. Total fi- 
nancial assets of 401(k) participants without an IRA increased by $1,314, and 
total financial assets of 401(k) participants with an IRA increased by  $5,637. 
In neither case was there an important change in non-IRA-40l(k)  assets. This 
is exactly the result shown by PVW for groups 3a and la  in table 1.4. Thus the 
composition problem inherent in the EGS comparison creates the illusion of 
substitution when in fact the data do not show that.14 The regressions run by 
EGS  and  reported  in  table  5 of  their  paper  (1994)  suffer  from the  same 
problem. 
In all three of the groups used by EGS, there was an increase in total finan- 
cial asset saving as IRA and or 401(k) assets grew. In none of the three groups 
was there  a substantial change  in non-IRA-40l(k)  financial  assets. The in- 
crease in the financial assets of the EGS control group was due to an increase 
in IRA assets, which-when  compared to the fall in the assets of the composite 
group-lead  EGS to conclude that the 401(k) plan had no effect. But the fall 
in  the assets of the composite group is an illusion  created by  the changing 
composition of the group. 
1.4  The 401(k) Eligibility “Experiment” 
Another approach relies on the “experiment” that is provided by the largely 
exogenous  determination  of  401  (k)  eligibility,  given  income.  It  considers 
whether eligibility is associated with higher levels of total saving, holding in- 
come and other demographic characteristics constant. In this case the key ques- 
tion is whether  families who were eligible for a 401(k) in a given year had 
larger total financial asset balances than  families who were not eligible, or, 
equivalently,  did  non-40l(k)  financial  assets  decline  enough  to  offset  the 
401(k)  contributions  of  eligible  families? This  approach  is  used  in  PVW 
(1994a, 1995). 
1.4.1  The Method 
Unlike the IRA program, only persons whose employers establish a 401(k) 
plan are eligible to contribute to such a plan. This creates a natural opportunity 
to compare the saving of eligible and noneligible households. In this case, we 
make a bemeen-group comparison of assets at a point in time. The data set for 
each year represents a random cross section of respondents in that year. Thus 
14. This composition fallacy is a classic error in empirical analysis made clear by Bickel, Ham- 
mel, and O’Connell (1975) in their analysis of  graduate student admissions at the University  of 
California, Berkeley. While grouping departments made it seem as though there was discrimina- 
tion against women, looking at individual departments made it clear that in no single department 
was there discrimination. It was just that women were applying to  departments where the admis- 
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the random samples in different years have essentially the same demographic 
characteristics. But samples drawn in later years have had longer exposure to 
retirement saving plans. This means that s-the  number of years of saving in 
any  form-remains  the  same even  though retirement  program  exposure  is 
greater for more recent samples. 
Suppose that the saving commitment of the typical eligible household in the 
most recent period  is represented  by  m, and the commitment of  noneligible 
households by mJ.  In an earlier period, the commitment of the typical eligible 
household is represented by m,.  and the commitment of noneligible households 
by mJ . After exposure to the program for n and n+k years, respectively, the 
assets of eligible households are given by 
A5,(n, = h(s) + mz,f(s)  + p,g(n>, 
As,@  + 4 = h(s) + m,fW + p,g(n  + k), 
and the assets of noneligible households are given by 
AJn)  = h(s) + mJ(s), 
A,(n + k) = h(s) + mlf(s). 
To determine the program effect, p,,  we consider the between-group differ- 
ence in the assets of eligible and noneligible households at a point in time, 
which after n+k years of exposure is given by 
(9)  A,, (n  +  k) -  +  k) = (m,  - m,>f(s)  + p,g(n  + k). 
If m, = mj,  the difference represents the program effect. Thus a critical ques- 
tion is whether the saving propensities of the two groups are in fact equal. At 
the outset of the program, when n = 0, the assets of the two groups will differ 
only if m,,  and ml,  differ, with 
Ax,@) -  AJO)  = (mt* - m,Ms>. 
Thus, if  the two groups have equal assets at the outset of the program, the 
implication is that the saving commitments of the two groups are equal, and 
vice versa. We use this test to establish approximate equality of taste for saving 
near the outset of the program. 
The estimate presented in equation (9), however, depends not on the equality 
of saving commitments at the outset of the program but on equality of saving 
commitments at a later point in time (1991 in our case). What would assure 
that this equality is maintained? Suppose that the two groups are composed of 
equally committed savers at the outset of  the program, with ml.  = mJ,.  Over 
time, more households became eligible for a 401(k). As long as newly eligible 
households are a representative sample of the former noneligible households, 
the two groups will continue to be composed of equally committed savers and 
the difference in assets at a point in time will represent the program effect. 46  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.6  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k)  Eligibility: 
Families with Income $40,000 to $50,000 
Results for 1991  Results for 1984 
Asset Category and Eligibility Status  (1991 $1  (1984 $) 
Total financial assets 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
Non-IRA-401 (k) assets 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
Not eligible for a 40 1  (k) 
14,470* 
6,206 
4,124  5,027 
4,250  5,082 
Source; Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995). 
Note: These are medians controlling for age, marital status, and education. 
*Difference between eligibles and noneligibles is statistically significant at the 95 percent confi- 
dence level. 
1.4.2  The Results 
Inferences about the net saving effect of 401(k) contributions depend on the 
similarity of the saving behavior of families who are and are not eligible for a 
401(k), m, versus m,,  controlling for income. It is important, for example, that 
the eligible group not be composed disproportionately of savers. The data show 
little evidence of this type of difference in saving behavior. The most compel- 
ling evidence is for 1984. In that year eligibles and noneligibles had about the 
same level of other financial assets, controlling for income. Thus these data 
suggest that near the outset of  the 401(k) program families that were newly 
eligible for a 401(k) exhibited about the same previous saving behavior as fam- 
ilies that did not become eligible-m,  and m, were about the same. 
Data for families with incomes between $40,000 and $50,000, presented in 
table 1.6, illustrate the findings. In 1984, newly eligible and noneligible 401(k) 
families had almost identical non-40 1  (k)-IRA assets-$5,027  and $5,082, re- 
spectively. By  1991, however, the median of  total financial assets of eligible 
families  was  $14,470, compared to $6,206 for noneligible  families. But  in 
1991, the non-IRA-4Ol(k)  assets of the two groups were still about the same, 
$4,724 for eligible and $4,250 for the noneligible group.” If families reduced 
saving in other forms when they became eligible for a 40 1  (k) plan, the typical 
eligible family in 1991 would have accumulated less wealth in other financial 
assets than the typical noneligible family. This was not the case. 
Similar comparisons  are reported  in  appendix  table  1C.l for all income 
groups. In  1984, the ratio of  median non-IRA-40l(k)  assets of  eligibles to 
noneligibles, weighted by the number of observations within income intervals, 
15. The apparent reduction in the non-40l(k)-IRA assets of both groups between 1984 and 1991 
is due largely to earnings growth. The income intervals are not indexed, and thus families in  a 
given interval in 1984 will tend to have greater wealth than families in that same interval in  1991. 
Comparable calculations with the intervals indexed to  1987 dollars are discussed in section 1.6.2 
and reported in tables 1.10  and 1.11 and in appendix tables  I C.3 and 1C.4. 47  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
was exactly one. The ratio  of  means was 0.87,  indicating that the  mean  of 
non-IRA40l(k)  assets of the eligible group was lower than the mean of non- 
eligibles. By  1987 the ratio of total financial assets of eligible to noneligible 
families was 1.62, and by  1991 this ratio was 2.22. This evidence suggests a 
sizable effect of 401(k)  saving on the  accumulation  of financial  assets and 
shows  little  if  any  substitution  of  401(k)  contributions  for other  financial 
asset saving. 
Indeed, for all income groups, eligible households have greater total finan- 
cial assets than noneligible households at virtually all points across the entire 
distribution  of financial assets. But there is virtually no difference across the 
entire  distribution  of  the  other  financial  assets  of  eligible  and  noneligible 
households, as shown in PVW (1995). 
For comparisons between eligible and noneligible households to shed light 
on the net saving effect of 401(k) plans, it is important that the saving behavior 
of  the eligible and noneligible groups be comparable. As noted above, after 
controlling for income, the accumulated assets of the two groups were very 
close at the outset of  the program. Nonetheless, there could have been some 
change in the composition of the two groups over time, even if  eligibles and 
noneligibles were very similar in 1984. Data on measured household attributes, 
however, suggest that there was little composition change. 
Many studies of saving behavior have shown that saving commitment is re- 
lated to household demographic attributes, such as age and education. As ap- 
pendix  table  lC.5 shows, these characteristics  did not  change  substantially 
over time. The average age of the head of  eligible households was 41.8  in 
1984 and 4 1.4 in 199  1. The average years of education of the head of eligible 
households was 13.6 in 1984 and 13.7 in 1991. Within income interval, there 
was also very little change in the average age or education of eligible families. 
Similarly, there was little change in the age or education of noneligible house- 
holds. The proportion of households with husband and wife present, which is 
typically found to be positively related to saving behavior, declined by 7 per- 
centage points, on average, for both eligible and noneligible households. Much 
of saving commitment, however, cannot be explained by observed household 
attributes, and we rely on the cohort approach discussed below to provide a 
check on the eligibility experiment  results.  The cohort analysis is not  con- 
founded by the potential difference between the saving commitment of eligible 
and noneligible households. 
EGS question the validity of our comparisons between 401(k) eligible and 
noneligible households. They argue that “401  (k) eligible families save more in 
non-4Ol(k) assets than  observationally  equivalent noneligible families, even 
after controlling for other factors.” In our view, however, their numbers differ 
little from ours. They say, for example, that the two groups had different asset 
levels in  1984. But they  estimate a (statistically insignificant)  difference in 
median financial assets of only $173. They estimate a difference in median net 
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characteristics and compares households  within  income intervals,  while  the 
EGS approach simply includes income as a single variable  in a regression 
equation, their estimates seem hardly different from our findings. 
EGS find a difference of $2,500 in  1984 in the net worth of eligible and 
noneligible households. The median for the entire sample is about $30,000 so 
the estimated difference represents a percentage difference of under 9 percent. 
In section 1.6 below, we repeat our analysis including housing equity, and con- 
trolling for income interval as above. We find essentially no difference in the 
housing equity of eligible and noneligible families in 1984. 
EGS also find that eligible families are more likely than noneligible families 
to have a traditional defined benefit employer-provided pension plan. Whether 
this reflects a difference in  saving propensity is questionable. That depends 
first on whether people choose jobs based on the pension plan. And, if they do, 
it is not at all clear that wanting a good pension plan means a stronger prefer- 
ence for saving. It could mean just the opposite. It may well be that choosing 
a job where the employer saves for you is a means of self-control. If  a person 
is unlikely to save and would not do so were it not for the employer-guaranteed 
retirement income, then  the people who choose jobs with pensions may  be 
nonsavers, not savers. 
Assuming further that persons  with  defined benefit pensions  save less in 
other forms, Engen and Gale (1995) seem to argue that they should have lower 
financial assets in  1991 than noneligibles, if eligibility is independent of  the 
taste for saving. In this case, according to their reasoning, a finding that eligible 
families have about the same, or even more, assets as noneligible households 
in 1991 confirms that they have a stronger commitment to save than noneligi- 
bles. Engen and Gale (1995) conclude that even a finding that eligible families 
save the same amount in non40l(k) assets as noneligible families can be inter- 
preted  as evidence  that  401(k)  eligibility  is not  exogenous,  since eligibles 
should be saving less, if eligibility is exogenous with respect to saving. This 
reasoning seems to us self-fulfilling, assuming substitution to demonstrate sub- 
stitution. It is a remarkable change from all earlier studies of IRAs, in which 
the central hypothesis was that IRA participants should have less non-IRA fi- 
nancial wealth than nonparticipants, if IRAs and other financial assets are sub- 
stitutable. Here, the possibility that 401(k) eligibles may have more non-40l(k) 
assets than noneligibles is used as evidence for substitution. 
The weight of the evidence, however, is that persons with pensions do not 
reduce saving much, if at all, relative to persons without pensions. Gale (1995) 
argues that the methods that have been used by others to address this question 
are plagued by a series of biases that lead to an underestimate of the reduction 
in other saving for persons with employer-provided pensions. The key method 
that he proposes to avoid bias in his empirical analysis is a derived adjustment 
factor that multiplies pension wealth in regression equations relating other sav- 
ing to pension wealth. 
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estimates, his methodology, particularly his derived adjustment factor, raises 
new questions of interpretation. He derives the adjustment factor in a stylized 
life cycle model that assumes that a households consumption and saving, even 
before retirement, are proportional to the present discounted value of lifetime 
wage and pension income. There are three difficulties with this approach. First, 
the model assumes that persons view pension wealth and other financial assets 
as perfect substitutes, that there is a “complete offset between pensions and 
other wealth” (Gale 1995, 16-17).  Because the adjustment factor used in the 
empirical analysis is derived assuming complete substitution, the analysis can- 
not provide an unambiguous test of  the extent of  substitution. Much of  the 
empirical research  on saving, including  the analysis  of  tax-deferred  saving 
summarized here, suggests that the assumption is inappropriate. More concep- 
tual “behavioral” explanations of  saving behavior, in particular the work that 
emphasizes the “mental accounts” approach to saving, also bring into question 
this assumption. Second, the approach abstracts from the likely possibility that 
many households face liquidity constraints that make it difficult to consume 
out of pension wealth before retirement. Third, only a small fraction of persons 
who take a job with a pension early in the life cycle will retire from that job 
and acquire the rights to the defined pension benefit at age 65. Kotlikoff and 
Wise (1985, 1988, 1989) explain that a person who leaves a firm at age 40, for 
example, will have accrued only a small fraction of the age 65 pension. Such 
considerations imply that Gale’s (1995) findings are subject to new biases that 
cloud interpretation of his results. 
1.4.3  401(k) Eligibility and Other Pension Plans 
Our analysis has focused on the substitution between 401(k) assets and other 
financial assets. Another potential trade-off is employer substitution of 401  (k) 
plans for other employer-provided pension plans. The possibility of  such sub- 
stitution arises more directly with 401(k) plans than with IRAs because 401(k) 
plans are part of the workplace benefits package and their availability, like the 
availability of defined benefit or defined contribution pension plans, is subject 
to employer choice. 
Although substitution between traditional pensions  and 401  (k) plans is a 
theoretical possibility, existing empirical evidence provides little support for 
such substitution in practice. As discussed above, EGS present evidence that 
workers who are eligible for 401(k) plans are more likely to be covered by a 
defined benefit pension plan than are workers without 401  (k) eligibility. Al- 
though they interpret this as evidence of  saver heterogeneity, it is prima facie 
evidence against the pension substitution hypothesis. Papke (1995) uses data 
from 1985 and 1991 IRS Form 5500 filings, and Papke, Petersen, and Poterba 
(1996) use data from a survey of 401(k) providers, to provide further evidence 
on this question.  There is essentially  no evidence that large  firms offering 
401(k) plans substituted these plans for other pension plans; the first 401(k)s 
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benefit pension  plans. Papke (1995) finds some evidence of  substitution at 
smaller firms that have introduced 401(k) plans in recent years. 
1.5  Cohorts and the Effects of Retirement Saving Programs 
This method compares the assets of  persons who are the same except that 
they reached a given age in different calendar years. Hence some cohorts had 
longer than others to contribute to special saving programs. For example, fami- 
lies that reached age 65 in 1984 had had only two years to contribute to an IRA 
or to a 401(k) plan, but families who attained age 65 in  1991 had had nine 
years to contribute. If these programs affect personal saving, they should lead 
to differences in asset accumulation by cohort. 
1.5.1  The Cohort Method 
Consider a random sample of all families, and assume for the moment that 
the typical family i has saving commitment m,.  Cohorts are distinguished by 
age (c) in 1984. We assume that cohort c  has had s  years to save. Suppose that 
in 1984 cohort c has had s  years to save and during n of these s  years was able 
to contribute to special retirement  saving programs. We  follow each cohort 
from  1984 to  1987 to  1991. For simplicity, we can assume that the cohort c 
begun the period having saved for s years and ended the period having saved 
for s+k years. By 1991, each cohort has had n+k years to contribute to special 
retirement saving programs. (In 1984, n is about 2; in 1991, n+k is about 9.) 
For cohort c, assets after n and n+k years of exposure are given by 
Ao(n+k) = h(s+k) + m,f(s+k)  + p,g(n+k). 
Consider now an older cohort (c-tk) that begun the period having saved for 
s+k years.  For  this  cohort,  assets  after n  and  n+k years  of  exposure  are 
given by 
This second cohort is k years older than the first cohort in the same calendar 
year. Thus the difference in the assets of the two cohorts when both have saved 
for s+k years is given by 
(10)  Ac,(n  + k) -  A'+,,@) 
= (mt  -  m,)f(s  +k) + p,[g(n  +  k) - g(n)l = p,[g(n  +k) - g(n)l. 
Thus the difference in the assets of families who reached the same age in calen- 
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Table 1.7  Summary of Cohort Effects at Ages 60-64  (in 1991 dollars) 
Asset  1984"  1991 
Contributors and Noncontributors Combined 
Mean 
Personal retirement assets  5,118 
Other personal financial assets  37,132 
Total personal financial assets  42,250 
Percentage of cohort  38 
Median 
Personal retirement assets  8,171 
Other personal financial assets  22,983 
Contributors 
Total personal financial assets  34,975 
Noncontributors 
Percentage of cohort  62 
Median 










Source: From Venti and Wise (1997), converted to 1991 dollars. 
%The  means and medians reported in this table are controlling for age, income, marital status, and 
education. The 1984 totals exclude 401(k) assets, which were small at that time. Thus the data for 
personal retirement and for total personal financial assets are affected to some degree by  this 
omission. But the data on other personal financial assets are unaffected. 
If the different cohorts had different saving commitments, however, the term 
m,  -  m,  in equation (10) would not be zero, and the difference would reflect 
this, as well as the program effect. Judgments about the likely importance of 
such differences may be based on several features of the analysis. Cohort ef- 
fects are obtained for a succession of cohorts ranging in age from 42 to 70 in 
1984. These cohort effects are obtained for several asset categories:  special 
retirement  saving program  assets, total financial assets, and conventional fi- 
nancial assets. Differences in the cohort effects for different assets can be used 
to judge whether there was a systematic change in taste for saving over time. 
It is also possible to compare cohort effects for participants  and nonpartici- 
pants in retirement saving programs. 
1.5.2  The Results 
The cohort  method  was  used  by  Venti  and Wise  (1997). They  find that 
households who attained a given age in 1991 had consistently larger total real 
financial assets  than households  who reached  that  age in  1984. The larger 
assets of  the younger cohorts is accounted for almost entirely by more assets 
in IRA and 401(k) plans. There is on average no difference between the other 
financial assets of the older and younger cohorts. The results can by illustrated 
by comparing the assets of families who reached ages 60-64  in 1984 with the 
assets of families that attained those ages in 1991, as shown in table 1.7. 
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noncontributors combined-are  the most compelling. In this case it is the typi- 
cal saving propensity m,  over all families that is important, and the possible 
effect of the changing composition of participant and nonparticipant families 
is avoided. (Because fewer than half of all families participate in these pro- 
grams, the median of program assets for all families is zero and thus not infor- 
mative.) The mean of  total financial assets of  all families that attained ages 
60-64  in  1984 was $42,250; the mean of those who attained this age in  1991 
was  $50,419  (both values are in  1991 dollars and control  for income, age, 
education, and marital status). The increase was accounted for almost entirely 
by personal retirement saving-$5,118  for the cohort that attained ages 60-64 
in  1984 compared to $14,156 for the cohort that attained this age range in 
1991. There was  essentially  no  cohort  difference  in  other  financial  assets 
($37,132 for the older cohort and $36,263 for the younger cohort). Thus there 
is little evidence of substitution of personal retirement saving for other finan- 
cial assets. 
The data for families who participated in personal retirement saving plans 
provide a better measure of the potential of the plans to augment the financial 
assets of retirees. The median level of total personal financial assets of contrib- 
utor families that attained ages 60-64  in  1984 was $34,975, compared with 
$50,182 for families who attained that age range in 199  1. The median level of 
personal retirement plan assets of the families that reached this age range in 
1984 was  $8,171, compared  with  $22,148 for families  who  reached  ages 
60-64  in 1991. On the other hand, the other financial assets of these families 
were about the same in 1984 and 1991 ($22,983 and $21,528, respectively). 
Although not as compelling as the data for both groups combined, these data 
also provide little evidence of  substitution. In contrast, the financial assets of 
families that attained ages 60-64  in 1991 and did not participate in personal 
retirement plans were somewhat lower than the assets of similar families who 
reached this age range in  1984. 
The results for other age groups are summarized in figure 1.3. To understand 
the figure, consider age 66: The cohort that reached this age in 1984 had about 
$5,000 less in personal retirement assets (heavy lines) than the next younger 
cohort that reached that age about four years later. The difference in the total 
financial assets (light  lines)  of these two cohorts is also about $5,000. But there 
is very little difference in the other financial assets of these two cohorts. 
Results of more formal estimation of cohort effects are shown in table 1.8. 
The estimates  are obtained by  fitting a cubic function  in  age to  the cohort 
means, allowing for cohort shifts-the  cohort effects-in  the relationship be- 
tween age and assets.I6  The estimate of the youngest cohort effect for personal 
16. We fit the actual cohort means with a specification of  the form 
(11)  A,< = a  +  P,  + ?,(Age,) +  age,)'  + ?,(Age, )'  +  &,<. 
where A represents an asset category-personal  retirement assets, other personal financial assets, 
total personal financial assets-c  indexes cohort, and  i denotes the ith cohort mean. The P,  are 53  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
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Fig. 1.3 
and noncontributors  combined-indexed 
Note: In panel A,  light lines graph total assets, and heavy lines graph retirement assets. 
Mean assets: total and retirement (A) and other (B),  for contributors 
cohort effects with Xf3,  = 0. Thus the individual estimates represent deviations from the mean 
effect, which is set to zero. The specification is intended to fit the age-asset accumulation pattern, 
allowing the differences in the levels of the assets between successive cohorts to be maintained and 
to cumulate as the cohorts age. It is assumed, e.g., that the estimated difference between the assets 
of  the two youngest cohorts, C42 and  C46, will be maintained as the cohorts age. It is  likely 
that this assumption implies a conservative estimate of  the projected cohort differences. Constant 
percentage differences as the cohorts age, e.g., imply much larger absolute differences at advanced 
ages than this model does. 54  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.8  Estimated Cohort Effects for Means by Asset: Both Contributors and 
Noncontributors (in 1984 dollars) 
Personal  Total Personal  Other Personal 
Retirement Assets  Financial Assets  Financial Assets 
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Source: Venti and Wise (1997). 
retirement assets is $14,076 above the mean while the estimate for the oldest 
cohort is $13,103 below the mean, a difference of  $27,179. If  there were no 
counterbalancing cohort effects with respect to other personal financial assets, 
the total personal financial asset cohort effects should approximately parallel 
the retirement asset cohort effects. The estimates show that the total personal 
financial asset cohort effect for the youngest cohort is $I 6,002 above the mean 
and the cohort effect for the oldest cohort is $14,081 beZow  the mean, a differ- 
ence of $30,083. The other personal financial asset cohort effects are typically 
small and not statistically different from zero. An F-test does not reject the 
hypothesis that all the cohort effects with respect to other personal financial 
assets are zero. 
The analysis suggests that if current patterns persist families who reach re- 
tirement age 25 or 30 years from now will have much more in financial assets 
than families currently attaining retirement age, and the difference will be due 
solely to assets in personal retirement accounts. 
We believe that the cohort approach provides the surest way  of controlling 
for heterogeneity. When both contributors and noncontributors are considered 
jointly, the overall saving effects are not contaminated by potential changes in 
composition of the two groups. Nor are the cohort estimates confounded by the 
“coincidence” possibility that may affect the difference-in-difference estimates 
discussed in section  1.2. In  principle, the cohort analysis compares families 
who differ only in the calendar year in which they reached a given age and 
therefore in their exposure to retirement saving programs. 55  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and  Asset Accumulation 
A potential, although we believe unlikely, confounding influence would be 
an overall change in saving behavior,  with each successively younger cohort 
wanting to save more than its older cohorts. The evidence suggests that such a 
systematic increasing taste for saving must have been realized only in contribu- 
tions to the special retirement saving programs. We find this an unlikely possi- 
bility for two reasons. There are no cohort effects in other financial assets, as 
we would expect if there were an underlying change in taste for saving. Nor 
are there cohort effects for nonparticipants, as we would also expect if there 
were an overall change in the taste for saving. Therefore, we interpret the co- 
hort results as supporting the results of the other methods of correcting for het- 
erogeneity. 
1.5.3  Further Results 
Registered Retirement Saving Plans (RRSPs) were first introduced in Can- 
ada in  1957. As with the IRA in the United States, an individual can make 
contributions to an RRSP and deduct the contributions  from income for tax 
purposes. Interest accrues tax free until withdrawal, when taxes are paid. The 
contribution limits were increased substantially in the early 1970s, and RRSPs 
were widely promoted. Since then, they have become a very prominent form 
of saving. Annual contributions grew from $225 million in 1970  to almost $3.7 
billion in  1980 to $16 billion  by  1992, when they accounted for about one- 
third of aggregate personal saving. In 1992 about 33 percent of families con- 
tributed, with an average contribution of  $4,180. Now RRSP contributions ex- 
ceed the total of employee and employer contributions to employer-provided 
pension plans. 
Based largely on “cohort” analysis like the procedure described above, Venti 
and Wise (1995b) conclude that RRSPs have contributed substantially to per- 
sonal saving in Canada. In virtually no case do the data suggest substitution of 
RRSP saving for other forms of retirement saving. In the two decades prior to 
the growth in RRSP popularity, the personal saving rate in Canada was typi- 
cally below the U.S. personal saving rate. Since that time, the personal saving 
rate in Canada has become much higher than in the United States. Although it 
is difficult to make judgments about the RRSP saving effect based only on the 
trends in U.S. and Canadian aggregate saving rates, the cohort analysis sug- 
gests that a large fraction of the current difference can be accounted for by 
RRSP saving. Engelhardt (1996b) analyzes the similarly tax-advantaged Reg- 
istered Home Ownership Saving Program (RHOSP), designed to encourage 
saving for home purchase. He finds that the RHOSP program also increased 
total personal saving. 
1.6  Other Margins of Substitution: Home Equity 
The foregoing discussion focuses on the substitution between contributions 
to special retirement saving plans and other financial assets. There are at least 56  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
two other potential margins of substitution: employer-provided pension assets 
and home equity. As mentioned above, many analysts have considered the sub- 
stitution  between  employer-provided  pension  assets  and  personal  financial 
assets. The results are mixed, but the weight of the findings suggests little sub- 
stitution.” Venti and Wise (1997) have also addressed this question, consider- 
ing the assets of retired persons for whom pension assets are known, and using 
social security benefit percentiles to control for lifetime income. They con- 
clude that there is essentially no relationship between employer-provided pen- 
sion assets and either personal retirement saving plan assets or other financial 
assets. They considered the same question for retired persons in Canada, where 
the RRSP program  has been  widely  used for several decades, again finding 
essentially no relationship between employer-provided pension assets and per- 
sonal financial assets. We will not address that question further here. 
We will, however, consider the potential substitution between housing eq- 
uity and retirement saving plan assets. Our focus on the relationship between 
retirement saving assets and other financial assets neglects the possible interac- 
tion between these retirement plan assets and home equity, which is the largest 
asset of a large fraction of households. While many of the factors that are likely 
to determine whether to purchase a home, the value of the home, and how to 
finance a home purchase may be unrelated to the accumulation of retirement 
saving assets, it is possible that some of the buildup in these accounts has been 
financed through reduced accumulation of housing equity. 
Several studies have considered the relationship between housing prices and 
financial assets. In his review article, Skinner (1994) finds little relationship 
between exogenous shocks to housing value and personal financial assets. Sev- 
eral other studies are based on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics: Skinner 
(1996) finds a small relationship for younger households and no relationship 
for older households. Hoynes and McFadden (1994) find little relationship be- 
tween exogenous changes in home values and changes in financial assets. En- 
gelhardt (1996a) finds no decrease in financial asset saving among households 
with an increase in home values but finds a small increase among households 
with falling home values. Engen and Gale (1995) have considered the relation- 
ship between home equity and 401(k) assets based on SIPP data. While their 
results  largely confirm our findings on the relationship between 401(k) and 
other financial assets, they conclude that the increase in the financial asset sav- 
ing of 401(k) participants (or eligibles) between 1987 and 1991 was offset by 
a reduction in home equity. 
We consider the relationship between retirement saving plan contributions 
and home equity using cohort analysis as in  section  1.5 and comparison of 
401(k) eligible and noneligible families as in section 1.4. The most important 
conclusion from the cohort analysis is that the timing of changes in mortgage 
debt and net home equity is inconsistent with a causal relationship between 
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personal  retirement  plan  contributions  and mortgage  debt. With respect  to 
401(k) contributions in particular, we conclude from the eligibility comparison 
that there was no apparent offset to 401(k) contributions through a reduction 
in home equity. We consider briefly one possible reason for the difference be- 
tween our results and those reported by Engen and Gale (1995). 
1.6.1  Cohort Analysis 
Cohort data make it easy to compare the trends in personal retirement saving 
and housing assets. As in the analysis above, we consider IRA and 401(k) parti- 
cipants and nonparticipants together.'* The interpretation of financial asset ver- 
sus housing equity trends must be tempered by at least two factors. First, mar- 
ket trends in housing values and financing practices that are unlikely  to be 
induced by IRA and 401(k) contributions can have substantial effects on hous- 
ing equity. There was probably  little relationship between  retirement saving 
plan contributions and the concerns that led to elimination of tax deductibility 
of nonmortgage interest as part of the Tax Reform Act of  1986. But this provi- 
sion may have had a substantial effect on home mortgage debt.I9  Thus the home 
equity data may be subject to very important time effects. 
Second, unlike other consumer debt, mortgage debt may, in the long run, 
increase future saving. Many financial planners tout mortgage debt repayment 
as the surest way  for a household to commit to a long-term saving strategy. 
Regularly scheduled mortgage payments can thus be viewed as means of self- 
control as stressed by Thaler and Shefrin (198 l), Shefrin and Thaler (1988), 
and Thaler (1990). While increased mortgage debt may appear as a reduction 
in wealth today, it may assure greater rather than reduced wealth at retirement. 
Similarly, a home equity loan that is repaid before retirement may not affect 
wealth at retirement. 
The central results of the cohort analysis are presented in figure 1.4, which 
shows the relationships between  contributions to personal retirement saving 
plans and housing market data. Like the results presented  in section  1 S,  the 
analysis here is based on 1984, 1987, and 1991 data for 15 cohorts: the youn- 
gest was age 42 and the oldest was age 70 in 1984.'O  The cohort data on hous- 
ing  value,  mortgage  debt,  and  home  equity  are shown  in  appendix  tables 
1C.2A through  1C.2C. Data for selected cohorts are graphed in figures  1.4A 
through 1.40. Figure 1.4A shows data for mean personal retirement assets (in- 
cluding IRA, 401(k),  and  Keogh  saving balances). Figure  1.4B pertains  to 
home value, figure 1.4C to mortgage debt, and figure 1.40  to net home equity. 
18. To  maintain comparability with the cohort analysis discussed above, we have converted cur- 
rent dollar amounts to 1991 values using the Bureau of Labor Statistics earnings index. Using a 
price index instead has little effect on the trends. 
19. Skinner and Feenberg (1990) find that each dollar of reduced consumer debt following the 
Tax Reform Act of  1986 was offset by a 67 cent increase in mortgage debt. 
20. In principle, we would like to consider younger cohorts as well, but we wanted these data to 
be comparable to our earlier analysis of  financial asset data  that was  directed to families ap- 
proaching and entering retirement. Fig. 1.4 
Note: (A) Retirement assets summary. (B)  Home value summary. (C)  home mortgage summary. (D)  Home equity summary 
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All values are in 1991 dollars. The figures can be explained with reference to 
figure  1.4A. For each of  the cohorts, mean retirement  assets are shown for 
1984, 1987, and  1991. For example, cohort C42 was age 42 in  1984, 44 in 
1987,*' and 48 in 1991. By  1991, this cohort had had nine years to contribute 
to the retirement saving program and had mean assets of $8,000 in these ac- 
counts at age 48. In contrast, cohort C48 had had only about two years to 
contribute to such accounts when first observed in  1984 and had only about 
$2,000 in these retirement assets at age 48. Similar comparisons can be made 
at ages 54, 60, and 66. The cohort that attained the given age later had much 
larger amounts in these retirement assets at that age. Figures 1.48  through 1.40 
present housing data for the same cohorts, and the trends can be compared to 
the cohort trends for retirement assets. 
Figure 1.4B shows a substantial fall in real home value between  1984 and 
1987 for younger cohorts but an increase for older cohorts. For all cohorts, but 
especially for the younger cohorts, there was a large increase in home values 
between  1987 and  1991. Given that housing values were falling during the 
rapid rise in retirement saving plan assets-and  only rising later on-these 
trends apparently reflect housing market effects that are unrelated to 401  (k) 
and IRA contributions. It is clear, however, that at ages where direct compari- 
sons can be made, the home values of younger cohorts are much greater than 
those of  older cohorts. For example, the cohort that reached age 48 in  1991 
had a real mean home value of about $80,000. The cohort that attained age 48 
in 1984 had a mean home value at that age of about $72,000, in 1991 dollars. 
Figure  1.4C shows a fall in mortgage debt between  1984 and  1987 for all 
cohorts. This pattern persists even for older cohorts that experienced an in- 
crease in home values between 1984 and 1987. Yet over this period there was 
a sharp increase in the IRA and 401(k) assets of  these cohorts, as shown in 
figure 1.4A. Between the early 1980s and 1986 contributions to these programs 
grew from about $3 billion to almost $74 billion. Contributions to 401(k) plans 
almost doubled between  1984 and  1986. Yet  it is clear that over this period 
when contributions to special retirement saving plans were growing dramati- 
cally there was no countervailing increase in home mortgage debt. 
There was an enormous increase in home mortgage debt between 1987 and 
1991 for all cohorts. Although assets in personal retirement saving plans con- 
tinued to grow over this period, the increase was not as rapid as over the earlier 
period, when mortgage debt was declining. Indeed, new contributions to spe- 
cial retirement saving programs declined between 1986 and 1991. Because of 
the 1986 cutback in the IRA program, contributions to that program fell from 
almost $40 billion in 1986 to less than $10 billion by  1991. Contributions to 
all special retirement programs decreased from about $74 billion in  1986 to 
about $68 billion in 1991, a decline of about 9 percent. Thus when contribu- 
21. The 1984 survey was administered between September and December 1984, and the 1987 
survey between January and April of  1987, a difference of  approximately 28 months. 60  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
tions to these programs were growing dramatically there was a fall in mortgage 
debt, and when contributions to the retirement saving programs were declining 
there was a dramatic increase in mortgage debt. This pattern does not appear 
to be consistent with substitution of IRA and 401(k) assets for housing equity. 
The cohort data confirm that changes in mortgage debt, as well as changes 
in home value, were not induced by contributions to retirement saving plans. 
It seems likely that the increase in mortgage debt for all cohorts after 1987 was 
prompted by the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 that eliminated the 
tax deductibility of nonmortgage debt. We consider, though, whether there was 
a difference in the behavior of younger and older cohorts over this period. 
Figure 1.40  summarizes the cohort data for home equity, which of  course 
is the difference between housing value and mortgage debt. There is a change 
in the cohort relationships, starting with the cohort that attained age 54 in 1984. 
The youngest cohorts have lower home equity than successively older cohorts 
up to the age 54 cohort. For example, the younger cohorts that reached ages 
48 and 54 in 1991 had lower mean values of home equity than the older cohorts 
that  attained  those ages in  1984. But for older cohorts, the  reverse  is true, 
younger cohorts have greater housing equity than successively older cohorts- 
at ages 60 and 66, for example. The cohort effects in home equity are very 
dissimilar from the cohort effects readily apparent in retirement saving assets 
and thus we judge were not prompted by contributions to special retirement 
saving programs. 
The time effects in home value and mortgage debt complicate the identifi- 
cation of cohort effects (this issue is discussed further in appendix A). None- 
theless, to provide some indication of the housing equity of successively older 
cohorts, we have estimated cohort effects (as above) by fitting the cohort means 
with a function cubic in age. The results are shown in figure 1.5. The first series 
shows estimated home value cohort effects, the second series shows mortgage 
debt effects, and the third series shows home equity effects. The home value 
effects range from +25,667 for the youngest cohort to -36,407  for the oldest 
cohort, a difference of 62,074. The mean home value  of  each successively 
older cohort is lower than the mean for the immediately younger cohort. Inter- 
preted  literally, if  there  were no changes in the housing  market, these  data 
would suggest that when  the current youngest  cohort attains the age of  the 
oldest cohort, the mean  home value of  the current youngest  cohort will  be 
$62,074 more than the mean of the oldest cohort. 
The home mortgage cohort effects show a similar pattern, ranging from a 
high of  +26,180 to a low of  -20,951.  Again, interpreted literally, these esti- 
mates would suggest that when the youngest cohort attains the age of the oldest 
cohort, that (future old) cohort will have $47,131 more in mortgage debt than 
the current old cohort. But here it becomes clear that the projections are likely 
to be exaggerated. Mortgage debt is likely to be paid down. If  it were com- 
pletely paid off by age 72, say, then the current young cohort would be wealth- 
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Fig. 1.5  Estimated cohort effects in home value, mortgage, and equity 
home value cohort effects ($62,074). The key question, which is not addressed 
by these data, is how much the current mortgage debt of the younger cohorts 
will be paid down. 
The home equity cohort effects mirror the pattern shown in figure 1.40. The 
estimated effect for the youngest cohort is -513,  while for the oldest cohort 
the effect is -  15,456. If the home mortgage were not reduced, the difference 
of $14,943 indicates that when the youngest cohort attains the age of the oldest 
cohort, the youngest cohort would have $14,943 more in home equity than the 
current oldest cohort.**  On balance, the home equity cohort effects magnib the 
financial asset cohort differences, showing successively greater financial assets 
with each younger cohort (see fig. 1.6). But if, as emphasized above, all mort- 
gage debt is reduced with age and the trend in housing value persists, the dif- 
ference in the assets of the younger and the older cohorts at retirement would 
be more closely indicated by the difference in home value. Since most retire- 
ment assets are likely to be accumulated until retirement, if mortgage debt is 
paid off by retirement age, wealth at that time will include retirement saving 
balances plus home value. 
1.6.2  The 401(k) Eligible-Noneligible Comparison: 
Evidence on Housing Equity 
An approach that is not complicated by a coincidental growth in retirement 
saving and mortgage debt is to compare the assets of  401(k) eligible and non- 
22. The difference between the home equity cohort effects varies with age, however. The effects 
increase from the youngest cohort to the cohort that is age 54  in 1984. Thereafter, the cohort effects 
decline, with successively older cohorts having less home equity. The difference between the youn- 
gest and the C54 cohort is $7,193. The difference between the C42 and the oldest cohort is $22,136. 62  James M. Poterha, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.6  Cohort effects in financial assets and home equity 
eligible families in a given year, based on a random cross section of  respon- 
dents of all ages. As described in section 1.4, for this comparison to be compel- 
ling, it is important that the eligible and noneligible households be similar with 
respect to saving propensity, controlling for income interval. As above, we use 
1984 data, near the outset of the 401(k) program, to demonstrate the similarity 
of the saving propensities of eligible and noneligible families. We first discuss 
data on trends in the housing equity of eligible and noneligible households. 
Trends in the Housing Equity of  Eligible and Noneligible Households 
The cohort data described above show changes in home mortgage debt and 
home values from  1984 to  1987 and from 1987 to  1991. Here we consider 
changes in home equity for families that are and are not eligible to contribute 
to a 401(k) plan. Table 1.9 shows that the trend was essentially the same for 
both groups. (These data show differences in the mean levels of home equity 
of eligible and noneligible households, without controlling for income interval. 
Within income interval, the differences are typically small, as discussed be- 
low.) There was very little change between  1984 and 1987 in mean home eq- 
uity for eligible or for noneligible households. This is consistent with the co- 
hort data, which shown a decrease for some cohorts and an increase for others. 
Between  1987 and  1991 there was a substantial decline in home equity for 
both eligible and noneligible households. The absolute decline is larger for 
eligible than for noneligible households, reflecting their larger absolute level 
of housing equity at the beginning of the period. The percentage declines were 
approximately the same for both groups, about 17 percent for noneligible fami- 
lies and about 19 percent for eligible families.23  Given that the absolute effects 
23. Home ownership declined  10 percent  for noneligible and 4 percent for eligible families, 
and mean home value of  home owners declined  12 percent for noneligible and  16 percent for 
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Table 1.9  Trends in Home Equity by 401(k) Eligibility, 1984,1987, and 1991 
(in 1991 dollars) 
Year 
Measure  1984  1987  1991 
Percentage own 













Percentage own, relative to 1984 
Mean home equity given own 
Mean home equity given own- 
Mean home equity 
Mean home equity, relative to 1984 
0.78 
0.63 


































of both market-determined housing price changes and availability of home eq- 
uity loans are functions of  initial housing equity, it is not surprising that the 
changes are roughly proportional to initial equity. 
Although percentage changes in mean values were about the same for both 
groups, the proportionate decline in medians, and other quantiles, was much 
greater  for noneligible  than for eligible  households.  Quantile values (50th, 
75th, and 90th) for eligible and noneligible households are shown in figure 1.7. 
Because a large fraction of  households do not own a home, medians can be 
substantially affected by  small changes in mean values. Like the means, the 
quantile changes between 1984 and 1987 were much smaller than the changes 
between  1987 and  1991. Between  1987 and  1991, median home equity for 
eligible households declined by 40 percent, the 75th percentile by  18 percent, 
and the 90th percentile by 5 percent; the declines for noneligible households 
were 71 percent, 25 percent, and  10 percent, respectively. These tabulations 
suggest that the forces that induced changes in home equity applied more or 
less equally to eligible and noneligible households during the 1987-91  period. 
The Eligibility Comparison 
We expanded our comparison of the assets of eligible and noneligible house- 
holds at a point in time to include net housing equity. As emphasized above, 
the validity of this difference as an estimate of the eligibility effect depends on 64  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Fig. 1.7  Home equity quantiles by eligibility and year 
the similarity of the underlying taste for saving of  the two groups. Again, we 
rely on comparison of  the assets of eligible and noneligible households near 
the outset of the program, in 1984, to establish the extent of similarity. 
Median  1984 asset balances are shown in table  1.10, by  income inter~al.’~ 
Within  an income interval,  the  medians  control for age, marital  status, and 
education. The assets of eligible and noneligible  families were  roughly  the 
same at the outset of the 401(k) program, whether the asset measure includes 
or excludes net housing equity.25  There is, however, a noticeable difference for 
the $75,000+ income interval. There are only 83 families in the 401(k) eligible 
group in this interval. Because this top interval is open ended, the incomes of 
eligible and noneligible households in this interval may be quite different. For 
most families, net non-IRA-40l(k)  assets were negative or very small in 1984. 
Thus any significant contributions to a saving plan, from which assets are not 
withdrawn, would therefore represent a net increase in the financial asset sav- 
ing of most families. 
Median assets balances in  1991 are shown in table  1.11. Although at the 
outset of the program eligible and noneligible families had approximately the 
same level of net financial assets, by  1991 eligible families had substantially 
greater median levels of net total financial asset balances, and greater levels of 
financial asset plus home equity balances, than noneligible families. 
The first two panels of table 1.11 show net total financial assets and net total 
24. The estimates are evaluated at the median of sample values for age, marital status, and educa- 
tion. Thus they differ from similar calculations reported in PVW (1995),  which are evaluated at 
the means of control variables. 
25. Appendix table lC.3 shows that eligibles and noneligibles had similar levels of other asset 
measures at the outset of  the 401(k) program in  1984. We  were unable to calculate conditional 
medians for home value and home mortgage. Table 1.10  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income Interval, 1984 (in 1984 dollars) 
Income Interval" 
Asset Category and 
Eligibility Status  <10  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  75 + 
Net non-IRA-40l(k)  financial 
assets 
Eligible  -  1,288  -651  302  716  2,815  6,241  22,068 
Not eligible  -  607  -  348  130  775  2,080  5,208  17,802 
Difference  -681  -  304  172  -  60  735*  1,034*  4,267* 
Net non-IRA-40l(k)  financial 
assets plus home equity 
Eligible  I 1.594  16,616  21,371  28,136  38,799  53,060  104,748 
Not eligible  1  1.293  14,398  18,632  28,46  1  36,327  44,462  83,338 
Difference  30  I  2,218  2,739  -325  2,472  8,598*  21,410* 
Source; Authors' tabulations from the 1984 SIPP. 
"Income intervals indexed to 1987 dollars. 
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Table 1.11  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income Interval, 1991 (in 1991 dollars) 
Income Interval' 
Asset Category and 
Eligibility Status  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  75 t 
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Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991 SIPP. 
"Income intervals indexed to 1987 dollars. 
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financial assets plus home equity, for eligible and noneligible households. For 
the  most part,  the  difference between the assets of eligible and noneligible 
families remains about the same when home equity is added to net total finan- 
cial assets. At the outset of  the program,  the financial  assets and the home 
equity of  eligible and noneligible families were about the same. They were 
also about the same in  1991 (more detail is shown in appendix table  1C.4). 
The difference between median levels of net non-IRA40l(k)  financial assets 
plus housing equity of eligible and noneligible families is about the same as 
the difference in net non-IRA-40l(k)  financial assets. Thus these data suggest 
that the greater financial assets of 401(k) eligible families were not offset by a 
disproportionate reduction in the housing  equity of eligible families. This is 
consistent with the data that show approximately equal proportional changes in 
the housing equity of eligible and noneligible families between 1984 and 1991. 
1.6.3 
Using a different approach, Engen and Gale (1995; hereafter EG) conclude 
that the  increase in the financial  assets of eligible families was offset by  a 
reduction  in home equity. We  do not explore  the differences between  their 
results and ours in detail here, but we do describe the key elements of  their 
method  and provide some conjectures about possible reasons for the differ- 
ences. 
The Engen and Gale Between-Group Results 
The Method 
To study the relationship between 401(k) saving and home equity, EG use 
an approach similar to the one described in section 1.3.2 above. They consider 
several between-group comparisons, including 40 1  (k) eligible versus noneli- 
gible families and 401(k) eligibles who have an IRA versus 401(k) noneligibles 
who have an IRA. For illustration, we consider first the former comparison, 
denoting the first group by i and the second group by j.  We treat the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA86) as a “program,” with an effect on both groups. Using the 
same terminology as in equation (7),  the “treatment” group  (i) is subject to 
both the 401(k) and the TRA86 program effects, p,  and rt,  respectively, while 
the comparison group (j)  is subject only to the TRA86 effect. The difference- 
in-difference estimate including both the saving program and the TRA86 ef- 
fects would be 
&,(n  + k) -  As,(n)l - [A,(n + k) -  A,(n)l 
(12)  = [(m,  - m,,)  - (m,  - m,*)lf(s> 
+b,[g(n+k) - g(n)l + (r - q”(u+k)  - d411. 
To make clear that years of exposure to TRA86 may differ from exposure to the 
saving program, we let u indicate the number of years of exposure to TRA86 at 
the first observation (e.g., 1987) and u+k the number of years of exposure to 68  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
TRA86 at the second observation (e.g.,  1991). This method will estimate the 
401(k) program effect p,  if two conditions are met: m, = m, and m, = m, ,  or 
if m, -  m,. = m, -  m,,,  as discussed above, and rc = r,. But if the two groups 
have very different levels of home equity at the outset, it is unlikely that the 
effects of TRA86, r, and r,, will be equal, at least in levels. 
If  the  comparison is between  401(k) eligibles  who  have  an  IRA  versus 
401(k) noneligibles  who have an IRA, the treatment  group (i)  is subject to 
three program effects: 401(k), IRA, and TRA86-p,,  b,, and rl,  respectively. 
The  comparison  group  (j)  is  subject  to  two  program  effects:  IRA  and 
TRA86-bJ  and r,. In this case, the difference-in-difference  estimate is 
[A&  +  k) -  Ar,(n)l - [AA,(n  +  k) - 4, (41 
(13)  = [(m, - m,t) - (m, -  mJ’>lf(s>  -+  [(P,  + bz) - b,l[g(n+k) - 
+ (I; -  5”(u  +k) - q(u)l. 
The program effectp, will be isolated if three conditions are met: m, = m, and 
m, = m, ,  or if rn[ -  m, = m, -  m,.,  rt = r,, and b, = b,.  Again, whether these 
conditions are approximately met is likely to depend on the initial conditions 
of the two groups. As emphasized  above, if the initial conditions of the two 
groups are very different it is more likely that the program effects on the two 
groups will differ as well. The effects of TRA86 are likely to depend on the 
initial home equity levels, and the potential effects of the saving programs may 
vary in nonsystematic ways with the initial financial assets of the two groups. 
Some committed  nonsavers may be completely  unaffected  by  the programs, 
for example. Thus it is problematic  whether any differencing procedure will 
adequately account for differences in the potential program responses of very 
dissimilar saver groups. 
Results versus Method:  Some Illustrations 
A complete understanding of why our results differ from those obtained by 
EG will have to await further analysis and discussion, but we believe one expla- 
nation is their use of dissimilar groups in computing a difference-in-difference 
estimator. Recall that PVW (1  994a, 1995) emphasize within-group estimates 
in the like saver group comparisons discussed in section 1.3.  EG use a between- 
group approach.2h 
The within-group approach that we used to evaluate the effect of the saving 
programs  on financial asset  saving may  not extend satisfactorily to include 
housing equity. Although housing equity may be affected by 401  (k) eligibility, 
it is also likely to have been affected by TRA86. A within-group  estimator 
cannot distinguish the separate effects of the two programs. Thus it is natural 
to seek a saver group affected by TRA86 but not by the 401(k) plan, with which 
26. EG  cite PVW (1995) as the source for their method. This is a misunderstanding of our 
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the 401(k) group can be compared. This is what the between-group estimate 
that EG use is intended to do. But typically  their comparisons are between 
dissimilar saver groups with very different saving behavior. The question then 
is how to obtain reliable estimates from between-group comparisons when the 
groups are so different. There may be no completely satisfactory  way  to do 
this-other  than a randomized controlled trial-and  we do not try to solve 
the problem. 
We do, however, illustrate the issue using data for the saver groups defined 
by 401  (k) eligibility and IRA participation status. These groups were consid- 
ered by PVW in the like group analysis discussed in section 1.3. (The financial 
asset data for the groups are shown in the bottom panel of table 1.4.). In their 
within-like-group  analysis,  PVW  emphasized  that  there  was  virtually  no 
change between  1984 and  1991 in non-IRA-40l(k)  assets of  401(k) eligible 
households, 401(k) eligible households with an IRA, or 401(k) eligible house- 
holds without an IRA (or in the non-IRA-40l(k)  assets of 401(k) noneligible 
households with an IRA). Yet for each of these saver groups there was a large 
increase in total financial assets. Based on between-group  comparisons, EG 
argue that the increase in financial assets between  1987 and 1991 was offset 
by a reduction in home equity. 
But this conclusion depends critically on whether the groups compared are 
similar or dissimilar, as the data in table  1.12 show. The question is whether 
there was a differential effect of TRA86 on the 401(k) eligible households, 
compared to the comparison households. Consider first 401  (k) eligibles with 
an IRA compared to 401(k) noneligibles with an IRA. These two groups had 
similar housing assets in 1984 at the outset of the 401(k) program and experi- 
enced similar declines in housing equity (10.2 percent for the eligible and 10.6 
percent for the noneligible group). In this case, the dollar declines were about 
the same as well. The decline for 401 (k) eligible households was $379 greater 
than the decline for noneligible households. Were one to assume that this is 
the  decline  due  to 40 l(k) eligibility-which  we  would  not-this  amount 
would offset very little of  the increase in the total financial assets of  401(k) 
eligible households between  1987 and 1991. 
When  very  dissimilar  groups  are  compared,  however,  this  approach can 
yield misleading results. For example, even though all 401(k) eligible and all 
40 1  (k)  noneligible households  experienced  similar proportional  declines  in 
housing equity (15.7 vs. 13.7 percent), the dollar declines were very different 
($4,513 vs. $2,254) because the two groups had very different levels of hous- 
ing equity at the outset of the program. Thus it is misleading to ascribe the 
greater decline in the housing equity of  the 401(k) eligible group to 401(k) 
eligibility per se, as the between-group comparison does. The greater decline 
for eligibles may simply reflect their larger initial housing equity. The groups 
also had very different levels of financial assets. This is why we emphasize 
within-group comparisons, and avoid inferences based on between-group com- 
parisons, in our like group analysis. 
One way  to estimate  the  reduction  in  housing  equity  attributable to  the Table 1.12  Home Equity by Saver Group and Year, with Between-Group Estimates: Conditional Medians in 1987 Dollars 
Difference to 1987 
to 1991  Difference 1984 to 1991 
Saver Group  1984  1987  1991  Percentage  Level  Percentage  Level 
All families 
401(k) Eligible  32,658  28,743  24,230  -25.8  -8,428  -  15.7  -43 13 
401(k) Not eligible  18,699  16,469  14,215  -24.0  -4,484  -13.7  -2,254 
Difference in difference  -  1.8  -3,944  -  2.0  -2,259 
Equal percentage reduction'  -597  -  579 
Families with an IRA 
401(k) Eligible  52,62  I  48,45  I  43,531  -  17.3  -9,090  -10.2  -4,920 
401(k) Not eligible  46,385  42,9  13  38,372  -  17.3  -8,013  -  10.6  -4,541 
Equal percentage reductiond  0  207 
401(k) Eligible  22,905  19,704  15,578  -32.0  -7,327  -20.9  -4,126 
401(k) Not eligible  12.399  10,575  8,696  -29.9  -3,703  -  17.8  -  1.879 
Difference in difference  -2.1  -3,624  -3.2  -  2,247 
Equal percentage reduction"  -  486  -  625 
Difference in difference  0.0  -  1,077  0.4  -379 
Families without an IRA 
"Difference between actual reduction of eligibles and the reduction had eligibles experienced the same percentage decline as noneligibles. 71  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
401(k) program would be as the difference between  the actual reduction in 
home equity (28,743 - 24,230) and the reduction had the treatment group 
experienced  the  same percentage reduction  as the  noneligible  group.  This 
yields an estimate of  $579, which  is small compared to the increase in the 
financial assets of this group. This approach seems plausible in this case be- 
cause programs that affect housing values and mortgages are likely  to have 
effects proportional to initial housing values. 
1.7  SCF: Summary Data and Gale and Scholz Parametric Analysis 
In section  1.2.4 above, we discussed the change in the financial assets of 
IRA contributors between  1983 and  1986, as their IRA assets accumulated. 
We concluded that these data, from the Survey of Consumer Finances, showed 
no substitution of  IRA contributions for other forms of saving, and that the 
IRA  contributions between  1983 and  1986 represented largely  new  saving. 
Based on parametric analysis of the same data, Gale and Scholz (1994; here- 
after GS)  concluded that virtually none of the additional IRA saving resulting 
from an IRA limit increase would be new saving. This result has often been 
interpreted  to  imply  that  none  of  the  IRA  saving  undertaken  during  the 
1983-86  period represented new saving, although GS are careful to emphasize 
that their analysis pertains to a limit increase. They conclude that, of  the in- 
crease in IRA contributions resulting from an increase in the limit, 3 1 percent 
would be financed by lower taxes, 2 percent would be funded by a decrease in 
consumption,  and 67 percent would come from a reduction in other saving. 
Our conclusion and that of  GS  are not necessarily inconsistent, although it 
seems unlikely that they could both be true. Thus we now consider what lies 
behind our different conclusions. 
We  first discuss the data on which our results in section 1.2.4 and the GS 
results are based. We consider the deletion of observations that preceded the 
GS estimation, and we draw attention to the potentially  important effect of 
sample selection on the GS results. Then we discuss more carefully the change 
in  the non-IRA saving of  contributors that would have been expected in the 
absence of the IRA program. We conclude that it is virtually impossible that 
IRA contributions between 1983 and  1986 came entirely from a reduction in 
other saving. We consider whether this conclusion could be consistent with the 
possibility  that an increase in the IRA limit would result in no new  saving. 
Finally, we explore the GS estimation procedure in detail and find that their 
results are not a robust reflection of the SCF data but rather are an artifact of 
their specification and estimation procedure. 
1.7.1  The Data 
The data and the GS estimation sample are described with reference to table 
1.13. For background, several features of the SCF data are important: (1) Only 
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Table 1.13  Observations in Matched 1983-86  Survey of Consumer Finances Sample, 
by IRA Contributor Status, Definition, and Observation Deletions 
Using  1986 IRA Balance  Using GS Contributor Assignment 
With GS Savings Deletions 
Without GS  With GS  Without GS 
Savings  Savings  Savings  PVW  GS Estimation 
Deletions  Deletions  Deletions  Replication  Sample 
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can be used in the analysis. (2) Some households are deleted because they did 
not meet the criteria for IRA participation or for other reasons were unlikely 
to contribute to an IRA. (3) The SCF data comprise of two samples: an “area 
probability”  sample  and  a  “high  income”  sample  that  oversampled  high- 
income households. (4) Whether a family contributed to an IRA during the 
period  is  not  reported  in  the  SCF,  so contributor  status must  be inferred. 
(5) Flow saving in other conventional  forms must also be inferred from the 
reported levels of assets in  1983 and 1986. Although we have been unable to 
match exactly the GS estimation sample, we believe that the differences do not 
materially affect the conclusions that we draw below. 
The 1983 SCF sample included 4,262 respondents, of whom 3,824 were in 
the area probability sample and 438 in the high-income sample. Of these, 2,791 
were surveyed in 1986 as welLZ7  Excluding families in which either the respon- 
dent or the spouse were self-employed, the age of the head was less than 25 in 
1986, the age of the head was greater than 65 in  1983, or there was a change 
27. The 1983 survey was conducted between  February and August  1983, with the majority of 
interviews in March and April. Thus 1983 IRA balances represent 1982 contributions for the most 
part. The  1986 survey  was conducted in  June through September  1986, so 1986 IRA balances 
represent contributions through the 1985 tax year. 73  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
in marital  status between  1983 and  1986 leaves a total of  1,670 households. 
Column (1) of table 1.13 gives a breakdown of this sample by area probability 
versus high-income sample status and by IRA contributor status. 
Because the SCF reports IRA balances but not annual contributions, to de- 
termine whether a household contributed to an IRA between  1983 and  1986 
requires assumptions about the return on assets, as well as other conventions. 
The GS assumptions are explained in appendix A to their paper. Column (1) 
in table 1.13 shows the number of observations using whether or not the family 
had an IRA balance in 1986 to indicate IRA contributor status. Of course some 
of these households could have contributed in 1982 but not thereafter and thus 
were not active contributors in the  1983-86  period. There were 1,021 house- 
holds without an IRA balance in 1986 and 649 with a positive IRA balance. 
Of the households with an IRA balance in 1986,24 percent of the respondents 
(156 of 649) were from the high-income sample. Appropriately weighted, only 
4.5 percent of all contributors would be from households in this high-income 
group. 
Column (3) shows the breakdown of  “contributors” and “noncontrib~tors” 
based on the GS contributor status assignment conventions. They use balances 
in 1983 and 1986 together with an assumed rate of return on 1983 balances to 
infer new contributions between the two years. These assignments yield fewer 
contributors than the number of households with a positive  1986 IRA balance 
(571 vs. 649), as expected. GS also use their assumptions to allocate house- 
holds to limit contributor status (those with estimated three-year contributions 
greater than the estimated three-year limit) and nonlimit contributor status. 
To estimate their model, GS eliminate a large number of additional observa- 
tions,  those with  1983-86  estimated  saving less than  -$lOO,OOO  or greater 
than +$lOO,OOO. The resulting sample is labeled “With GS Savings Deletions” 
in table  1.13. Their procedure removes  184 of  1,670 households, 61 noncon- 
tributors and 123 contributors. Of the 168 limit contributors, 61 are removed, 
including 82 percent (50 of 61) of the high-income sample limit contributors. 
Estimates based on the remaining 107 limit contributors determine the results 
of the GS estimation procedure. We were unable to replicate exactly the  117 
observations used by GS. Column (5)  shows the number of observations used 
in the GS estimation procedure, as reported in their paper. 
These deletions have an enormous effect on the distribution of  saving and 
assets in the estimation sample and on formal parameter estimates, as GS show. 
Mean and median estimated saving between  1983 and 1986 with and without 
these deletions, as well as non-IRA financial assets with and without the dele- 
tions, are shown in table 1.14. As the table shows, the sample deletions have 
enormous effects on the sample means. The GS estimation procedure is based 
on means, and their results are essentially determined by the few limit contrib- 
utors in the sample, so sample deletions can have an enormous effect on the 
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Table 1.14  Change in Mean and Median Saving and 1983 Non-IRA Financial 
Assets with and without Sample Deletions 
Measure and Deletion Choice  Mean  Median 
Saving 
Without GS deletions  ~  13,303  1,132 
With GS deletions  2,378  1,044 
Without GS deletions  217,668  5,700 
With GS deletions  22,244  4,222 
1983 Non-IRA financial assets 
we show below that the key parameter estimate is extremely sensitive to ex- 
actly which observations are deleted, and the sample deletions that are made 
essentially determine the conclusions that GS report. 
1.7.2  A Simple Reality Check 
In section 1.2.2 above, we discussed summary data (table 1.3) based on these 
same SCF surveys. We return to a similar discussion here, based on data re- 
ported in table  1.15. As explained above, using the  1983 and  1986 waves of 
the SCF it is possible to compare the asset balances of  the same households 
over time. We begin with respondents to the 1986 survey. We exclude house- 
holds with self-employed members and households with a change in marital 
status between 1983 and 1986. There are two reasons why the values in table 
1.15 may  differ from “comparable” values reported by GS: First, we restrict 
the sample to all households between ages 25 and 65 in  1986. Because GS 
limit their sample to households with heads aged 65 and under in  1983, some 
heads are as old as age 68 in  1986. We  believe that our sample is a better 
representation of  the pool of potential contributors, that is, nonretirees. Sec- 
ond, we also use a narrower definition of financial assets, including only those 
assets that we believe are most likely to be substituted for IRAs. Our measure 
includes checking accounts and statement, passbook,  share draft, and other 
saving accounts; stocks and mutual funds, saving bonds, and corporate, munic- 
ipal, and all other bonds; and money market accounts and CDs. The GS mea- 
sure includes in addition the cash value of life insurance, trusts, managed in- 
vestment accounts, and notes and land contracts owed to the household.2s  In 
addition, the summary data reported by GS in their tables  1 to 3 are based on 
different age criteria than their estimation sample, including all households 
over age 25, even those over age 65.29 
28. These additions change the magnitude but not the pattern of  the data reported in table 1.15. 
Data based on the GS definitions are shown in table 1.17 below. 
29. In addition, although the pattern revealed by the data is the same in both cases, the values 
reported here differ slightly from the numbers reported in table 1.3 for three reasons: (1) The 1986 
SCF  combines IRA and Keogh balances. GS present a method for inferring the 1986 IRA balance 
based on the 1983 response, and we use the GS method here. (2) We  use the newer set of sample 
weights here. (3) We use the GS definition of a change in marital status here. 75  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
Table 1.15  Survey of Consumer Finances Summary Data: Using GS Estimation 
Sample Definitions (in current dollars) 
Year 
Contributor Status and Asset  1983  1986  Percentage Change 
Medians 
Contributors in  1986 
Non-IRA assets  8,800  13,400  52.3 
IRA assets  600  6,857  1043.0 
Total financial assets  11,800  23,000  94.9 
Total financial assets  750  1050  40.0 
Noncontributors 
Median of Natural Logarithms" 
Contributors in 1986 
Non-IRA assets  9.083  9.503  42.0 
IRA assets  6.397  8.833  243.6 
Total financial assets  9.376  10.043  66.7 
Noncontributors 
Total financial assets  6.620  6.957  33.7 
Source: Authors' tabulations using the 1983 and the 1986 SCF. 
"he  percentage change is approximated by the difference in the logarithms. 
Median IRA and non-IRA financial asset balances in  1983 and 1986, and 
the change in balances between these years, are shown in the first panel of 
table 1.15, by  whether the respondent had a positive 1986 IRA balance. The 
table also shows total assets of contributors, including both IRA and non-IRA 
balances. (In anticipation of estimation results discussed below, the table also 
includes the median of the logarithm of assets.)30  Several features of the data 
are important: (1) The median 1983 non-IRA asset balance of households with 
IRA accounts in 1986 was $8,800. Clearly, prior to 1983, this group had not 
been accumulating assets at the rate of the typical household IRA contribution, 
about $2,300 per year. (2) The $6,257 increase in IRA balances (from $600 in 
1983 to $6,857 in 1986) clearly was not funded by transferring funds from the 
1983 balance in non-IRA accounts, which was only $8,800 at the beginning of 
the period. (3) Indeed, the non-IRA assets of contributors did not decline at all 
as IRA assets increased between  1983 and  1986. On the contrary, they in- 
creased over 52 percent, from $8,800 to $13,400. 
Without the IRA program, what increase in the 1983 non-IRA asset balance 
would have occurred over the next three years? The observed 52.3 percent in- 
crease was equivalent to an annual asset growth rate of  15 percent. If  IRA 
contributions  were funded either by  withdrawing funds from non-IRA  bal- 
30. When logarithms are used, assets of zero are set to one and assigned a logarithm of zero 76  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
ances or by reducing new saving in non-IRA assets, then the increase in non- 
IRA assets between  1983 and  1986 should have been much less than would 
have been expected in the absence of the IRA program. That is, the expected 
increase in  non-IRA  assets should have been  much  more than  the observed 
increase-from  $8,800 to $13,400. We consider a simple prediction of asset 
growth in the absence of IRAs. 
Assets tend to increase with age and income. A simple way to estimate the 
expected increase in non-IRA assets between  1983 and  1986 is to predict the 
increase based on the  1983 relationship between age and income on the one 
hand and assets on the other, with some allowance for change in the rate of 
return on assets. 
Even simple estimates of  the income-asset profile are confounded by  the 
nature of the data. There is enormous “residual” variance with respect to assets. 
For example, a linear regression of assets on age and income yields an R2 value 
of about 0.06 with a residual standard deviation of $2,400,000. If the data are 
weighted by  the appropriate sampling probabilities, the RZ  is about 0.07 and 
the residual standard deviation is about $540,000. (This portends the finding 
that sample deletions can have an enormous influence on the results.) In addi- 
tion, the data exhibit enormous heteroscedasticity, which we attempt to correct 
for by using a semilog specification of the form 
(14)  log A,,  = a  + b(Income,,)  + c(Age,J  + e. 
The predictions for 1986 are based on 
(15)  log A,,  =  log A,,  + b(Income,,  - Income,,)  +  age,, - Age,,). 
Thus the predictions  account for the change in assets associated  with an in- 
crease in age between  1983 and 1986 and for the change associated with the 
change in income. 
Predictions based on equation (15) are shown in table 1.16. The predicted 
increase in median assets based on a weighted median regression is about 23 
percent, which is less than the actual increase (based on the difference in logs) 
of about 45 percent. The predicted increase in mean assets is about 29 percent, 
compared to an actual increase of about 56 percent. 
Thus we predict a 1986 non-IRA asset level that is lower than the observed 
level, not higher than the observed level as would be expected if IRA contribu- 
tions simply substituted for saving that would have occurred anyway. 
The  1983 cross-sectional regression  implies  a difference in  the assets of 
families by  age. We  want to predict the increase for families who age three 
years and whose earnings change over these three years. The 1986 prediction 
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Table 1.16  Logarithm of 1983 Median and Mean Actual Assets and Predicted 
Median and Median 1986 Assets (in current dollars) 
1986 
Measure  1983  Predicted  Actual 
Weighted 
Median  9.048  9.280  9.503 
Mean  8.786  9.072  9.344 
Median  9.598  9.817  9.957 
Mean  9.594  9.839  10.555 
Unweighted 
between  1983 and 1986, and it accounts for the change in earnings by using in 
the prediction  the  1986 earnings of  the respondents. But the prediction  does 
not account for any change due to the return on initial asset holding. Inherent 
in the 1983 regression estimates of the difference in assets of people differing 
in age by  three years is also a rate of  return, but for an earlier period. If  the 
prior return differs from the 1983-86  return, the projected  asset increase may 
not apply to this later period. The magnitude depends on the difference be- 
tween the prior and ex post rates of return. Consider, for example, the AAA 
bond rate in 1980-82  versus 1983-85. The average during the first period was 
13.30 and during the second period 12.04. So correction for the rate of return 
would reduce the estimated increase. The return  on other assets may give a 
different sign; more detail on this issue is presented in appendix B. 
1.7.3  The Saving Effect of  Program Contributions versus the Saving Effect 
of a Limit Increase 
The foregoing analysis suggests to us that it is very unlikely that the bulk of 
IRA contributions were financed at the expense of withdrawals from non-IRA 
accounts, or from a reduction in new saving in non-IRA accounts. Indeed, if 
anything, the data taken at face value suggest that other saving increased as 
IRA contributions increased. Thus from these data alone we would argue that 
the contributions under the existing program represented largely new saving. 
Yet GS conclude, and they say explicitly in their paper, that an increase in the 
IRA limit would not increase saving. Here we consider the summary data that 
GS highlight in foretelling their formal results. In particular, we consider how 
the inferences that GS draw from the summary data can be so different from 
our judgments based on the same data. 
GS argue that limit contributors in particular, but nonlimit contributors as 
well, had substantial non-IRA financial assets in  1986. The implication is that 
if the limit were raised, these families could easily fund an IRA by transferring 
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because they could do that, they would. We emphasize the low level of  non- 
IRA assets in 1983, at the outset of the program, and the increase in these non- 
IRA assets as IRA contributions were accumulating. We infer from these data 
that the IRA accumulation could not possibly have been funded by  withdraw- 
ing funds from non-IRA balances and was unlikely  to have been funded by 
reducing new non-IRA saving that otherwise would have occurred. We want to 
understand what accounts for the difference between the $8,800 level that we 
emphasize and the $41,269 for limit contributors emphasized by GS. Part of 
the difference is simply their emphasis on 1986 assets versus our emphasis on 
1983 assets. Part of the difference is the definition of non-IRA financial assets. 
Part of the difference comes from differences in the meaning of limit contribu- 
tor. We  consider the last issue first and then  turn to differences in financial 
asset definitions. 
Limit Contributors versus All Contributors 
We have framed our judgments in terms of the addition to net saving repre- 
sented by the contributions of all contributors, both  limit and nonlimit. But 
because such a large fraction of contributions were at the limit, we believe that 
a higher limit would have led to still greater net saving. Based on an analysis 
of 1983  tax returns, Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) find that 75.3 percent 
of all IRA contributions were at the family limit and that an additional 11.3 
percent were at the limit for one spouse in households filing joint returns. EGS 
report that 63.3 percent of contributions were at the family limit over the period 
1982-86.  With such a large fraction of households  at the  limit, if  all limit 
contributors funded IRA contributions by  transferring funds or by reducing 
other saving, the summary data would show that. But they do not. We  infer, 
therefore, that if the limit had been higher, we would have seen a greater in- 
crease in assets by  1986 than actually occurred. 
In considering the effect of  a higher limit, the number of individual annual 
contributions made at the limit is the relevant statistic. Presumably, each con- 
tribution at the limit would have been at least somewhat greater had the limit 
been higher. Thus we should have in mind that between 60 percent and 85 
percent of contributions are by families in this category. 
GS point to an entirely different measure, suggesting that only 22 percent 
of contributions are at the limit. The families that GS call “limit contributors” 
are those  who  are assigned  limit  status  in each  of  three  consecutive years 
(1983, 1984, and  1985) based on their assignment criteria. They report 21.8 
percent at the limit based on these criteria. Thus the actual proportion of contri- 
butions at the limit is three or four times as large as the proportion assumed by 
GS. In considering whether persons at the limit would have contributed more, 
and saved more, had the limit been higher, recognizing that a much larger share 
of contributions are at the limit may well alter one’s prior expectations about 
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Table 1.17  Survey of Consumer Finances Summary Data: Using GS Definitions 
(in current dollars) 
Year 
Contributor Status and Asset  1983  1986  Percentage Change 
Contributors in 1986 
Non-IRA assets  13,085  19,000  45.2 
IRA assets  600  6,857  1,043.0 
Total financial assets  14,100  30,000  112.8 
Total financial assets  1,200  2,269  89.1 
Noncontributors 
Source; Authors’ calculations based on the 1983 and 1986 SCE 
Assets of All Contributors and Limit Contributors 
To understand the differences in the asset levels that we emphasize and those 
reported by GS, begin with the non-IRA financial asset values reported in table 
1.15,  which are $8,800 and $13,400 for 1983 and 1986, respectively. Following 
the presentation of the data in  their table 3, GS would emphasize the  1986 
balance, corresponding to $13,400. The 1986 balance reflects the increase in 
non-IRA assets during the time that IRA assets were acc~mulating.~~ 
The GS asset definition also differs from ours. Based on the GS non-IRA 
financial asset definition-but  still considering the assets of households with 
IRA balances in 1986, not the GS assignment procedure-we  find the values 
reported in table 1.17, for households aged 25-65  in 1986.32  The pattern is the 
same as that reported in  the top panel of table  1.15. In particular, non-IRA 
assets by this definition are $13,085 and $19,000 in  1983 and 1986, respec- 
tively. But even including asset balances from which we believe IRA contribu- 
tions are unlikely to be taken, the $13,085 balance in 1983 suggests that con- 
tributors had not previously been accumulating  assets at the rate of $2,300 
annually. 
The asset balances reported by GS differ in still other respects from those in 
table 1.17. GS report 1986 non-IRA financial assets of $21,695 for households 
with inferred contributions between 1983 and 1986. In addition to the inferred 
contributor definition, this estimate incorporates a broader age range, including 
all persons over age 24, even those who are over age 65 and unlikely to make 
3  1. Indeed, in the 1990 version of  their paper, GS emphasized that the level of  I986 non-IRA 
assets of  contributors was $13,500, very close to our measure of  $13,400. 
32. GS use an expanded definition of non-IRA financial assets that includes the cash value of 
life insurance, trusts, managed investment accounts, and note and land contracts owed to the house- 
hold. This sample also includes all households over age 25 in 1986, including those over age 65. 80  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
IRA contributions. Because older households tend to have greater assets than 
younger households, expanding the upper age limit may  significantly affect 
the results. 
Based on the three-year inferred limit criterion, the more inclusive definition 
of financial assets, and the all-inclusive age range, GS report median financial 
assets of their “three-year limit” contributors of $41,269.33  Because GS so se- 
verely underestimate the proportion  of contributions at the annual limit, the 
assets of  the much larger number of  persons  who  actually  contribute at the 
limit is probably lower than this. But there is no data-based value to compare 
with this figure, since the SCF does not report contributions between  1983 and 
1986. Using the  1983 and  1986 CES, we calculate that the median  non-IRA 
financial assets  of limit contributors were  $14,250 in  1983 and  $19,500 in 
1986.34 
In our view, the summary data reported in table 1.15 suggest that most con- 
tributions between  1983 and 1986 represented a net addition to saving and, in 
addition, are inconsistent with the possibility that families who contributed at 
the IRA limit did not increase net saving. Since a large fraction of contributions 
are at the limit, most of the increase in non-IRA financial assets as IRA contri- 
butions were accumulating must be attributed to limit contributors. Thus it is 
implausible that if the limit had been higher, these limit contributors would not 
have increased total saving still more. GS emphasize large financial asset val- 
ues for contributors by citing assets in 1986 instead of 1983, by using a broader 
definition of  financial assets, and, in the case of  limit contributors, by  citing 
the assets of families at their “three-year limit” rather than at the annual limit. 
1.7.4  The Gale and Scholz Model 
GS present estimates of a formal model that they believe supports the view 
that limit contributors would not increase net saving if the limit were increased. 
We explain here why we believe that their conclusion is not supported by the 
data. We  first describe their model  and then  present  and discuss two-stage 
“consistent” estimates of it that may be easier to understand than the full maxi- 
mum likelihood estimates. Finally, we explore directly  the properties of  the 
maximum likelihood specification used by  GS. In each case, we decompose 
the specification to identify its critical features. The important features of the 
specification may be lost when looking at the whole, but they are easily dis- 
cerned if the procedure and results are decomposed and  built up step by  step. 
33.  Based on our approximation to their sample, prior to their saving deletions, their estimation 
sample included approximately 168 persons at this limit. The number used to obtain this median 
asset balance will be somewhat larger than this because it included more older households. 
34. The CES financial asset definition matches approximately the definition used in table 1.12 
but is less inclusive than the definition used by GS. 81  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
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Fig. 1.8  The Gale and Scholz (GS) model 
Note: NlFA = non-IRA financial assets. 
We believe that the key GS results are an artifact of their model specification. 




I*  = Xp  + U, 
s = xy,  + E, 
s = xy,  + E, 
ifI <  0, 
if0 <  I  <  L. 
where I* represents  desired IRA saving and S represents  non-IRA financial 
assets saving. The variables X  are a set of household attributes. The specifica- 
tion can be described with reference to figure 1.8.  The line labeled I* repre- 
sents equation  (16), which is desired IRA saving and is limited at L. Other 
financial asset saving of IRA contributors is represented by the line labeled S, 82  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
and then S,,  and has two parts. Up to the kink point-associated  with some 
X*-it  reflects equation (18a). We sometimes refer to this component as “un- 
derlying’’ saving. The change in slope after X* reflects equation (18b) and in 
particular the value of q.  After the kink, the steeper slope recognizes the possi- 
bility that desired IRA saving in excess of the limit may be made up by increas- 
ing other saving. If q = 1, the difference between desired IRA saving and the 
limit L is the same as the difference between S and S,.  Thus the key parameter 
is q.3s  Equation (17), which describes the other saving of noncontributors, is 
essentially irrelevant in this specification and is not represented in the figure. 
In fact, in the GS specification, the saving of non-IRA contributors provides 
no information about the substitution between IRA and non-IRA saving. 
An identical figure was used by Venti and Wise to describe their specifica- 
tion (e.g., fig. 4.2 in Venti and Wise 1991). Thus in spirit the two specifications 
are very similar. But here the similarity ends. The method used to identify the 
change in the slope of S  after the IRA limit is reached is very different in the 
two approaches. 
How is q identified? We show below that in the GS model specification a 
downward bias in the “underlying” other saving function for limit contributors 
is balanced by an upward bias in q.  One may conclude therefore that the esti- 
mation procedure does not identify an q,  the key behavioral parameter. Before 
turning to this matter, however, we consider how q  might in principle be identi- 
fied and what the estimated value might mean. 
Assume that +the  effect of X  variables on IRA contributions-is  identi- 
fied from equation  (16). Then q is identified by variation in L. Since most 
variation in L is due to marital status, q is determined in large part by marital 
status. If the limit for married couples is $2,000 higher than the limit for single 
persons,  for example, and if  q = 1, married  limit contributors  should  save 
$2,000 less in other financial assets than single persons. If this is not the,differ- 
ence, in principle, q would change accordingly. Of the 107 limit contributors 
in our estimation sample, 80 are married and 27 are single. This does not pro- 
vide much evidence on which to base an estimate of q.  In addition, the speci- 
fication assumes that marital status does not influence other financial asset sav- 
ing,  except  through  the  lower  IRA  spillover  effect.  This  raises  a  further 
confounding issue. Marital status is not allowed to affect other saving directly, 
nor to affect IRA saving. Thus it only enters the equation for limit contributors. 
If, as most prior research suggests, marital status should properly be an explan- 
atory variable in the underlying other saving equation, then, for limit contribu- 
tors, q  will pick up this effect, in addition to any spillover effect. 
Although marital status is critical in the identification of q,  GS add to the 
35. As GS point out, the difference in the tax treatment of IRA and conventional saving could 
lead to values of  q greater than one. E.g., if households wanted to reach a given  asset goal by 
retirement age, the amount saved in conventional forms would have to be greater than the amount 
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specification some complexity, which also influences the estimated value of q. 
They allow q to be a function of covariates X, with q = XS, but they do not 
allow a constant term in the relationship. (The absence of a constant is associ- 
ated with an important error in the GS interpretation of  the results, and this 
issue is taken up below.) Now the specification for limit contributors becomes 
XY?  + (x~)(xp)  - (X6)L  = X[y,  + (XS)Pl - (X8)L. 
In this case, the effect of marital status is allowed to depend on other covar- 
iate~.~~ 
To demonstrate the critical features of the GS model we begin with a simpli- 
fied version, using only income as an explanatory variable. Then we proceed 
to the full GS specification. We use both a two-stage procedure that provides 
consistent estimates under the GS assumptions and the maximum likelihood 
procedure used by GS. All of our estimates are based on our replication of the 
GS sample, described in table 1.13. We use all the GS variable definitions as 
well as their procedure to assign limit and nonlimit contributor status. 
A Two-step  Procedure 
Suppose that equation (16) is estimated independently using a Tobit speci- 
fication to obtain estimates of the p coefficients. The other saving equation is 
(20)  S  = Xy2 + q(Xp - L) *  D  + (qu *  D  + EJ, 
where D identifies limit contributors. Under the assumptions of the GS model, 
the expected value of S can be written as 
E(S)  = Xy + q(Xp - L) * D  + ~~E(uIu  > L - Xp) * D 
+ E(E,~u  > L -  Xp) * D  + E(E,I -  Xp <  u < L - Xp)  * (1 - 0). 
Using standard results, we can write 
(23)  E(E,  I  - Xp  < u < L -  Xp) 
Under the assumptions of the GS model, consistent estimates can be obtained 
by estimating 
36. The multiplication of terms in X  is also likely to make identification tenuous. 84  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.18  Values of r) Estimated from Two-step Procedure by Specification 
Variables 
In IRA and Other  Standard 
Specification  Saving Equations  In  Estimated q  Error 
I  Income  Constant  -1.193  1.879 
2  Income and 
NIFA  Constant  0.835  1.828 
3  All Xs excluding 
NIFA  Constant  -  1.668  1.762 
4  All Xs including 
NIFA  Constant  0.103  1.712 
5  Income  Income, no constant  -1.591' 
6  Income and  Income and NIFA, no 
7  All Xs excluding  All Xs excluding NIFA, 
8  All Xs  including  All Xs including NIFA, 
9  All Xs excluding  All Xs excluding NIFA, 
10  All Xs including  All Xs including NIFA, 
NIFA  constant  -0.413" 
NIFA  no constant  -  1.889" 
NIFA  no constant  0.192' 
NIFA  plus constant  -  1.668" 
NIFA  plus constant  0.103a 
"valuated  at the mean of predicted r( for limit contributors 
S  = Xy + q(XP + u,X,  - L) * D  + D *  ~(T,X,  + (1 - D) *  puSX, 
= Xy + q(XP + U~X, - L) * D  + ~(T~[D  *  A? + (1 - D) *  X,], 
where P and (T,  are estimated from the first-stage Tobit equation and y, q,  and 
p(~,  are estimated in the second stage. 
We have estimated several specifications using this procedure, and the esti- 
mated values of q are reported in table 1.18. The equations use a variety of 
covariates X, ranging from income only to the full set of variables used by GS, 
and use several different specifications of q.  There are two important features 
of these results. First, in the most inclusive specifications, q is small. The esti- 
mate is 0.10 in specification 4 and 0.192 in specification 8. Specification 8 is 
analogous to the GS specification. If only a constant is included in the set of 
explanatory variables q,  the resulting estimate is q = 0.103. Second, the inclu- 
sion of  1983 non-IRA financial assets (NIFA) produces  a large jump in the 
estimated value of q.  This is a feature of both the two-stage procedure and the 
maximum likelihood procedure discussed next. 
Why does the inclusion of the 1983  level of NIFA lead to such large changes 
in q?  For illustration, we compare specifications 7 and 8. Non-IRA financial 
assets are included presumably to control for past saving behavior. In specifi- 
cation 8, aside from income, NIFA is the only statistically significant variable 85  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
Table 1.19  Predicted Underlying Other Saving, Total Other Saving, and Actual Other 





Xy Plus A,  Predicted Other Saving: 
Xy Only  and A,  Xy Plus A? and A, and A,  Actual Other Saving 







2,452  2,084  2,084 
682  2,149  2,149 
759  10,782  2,455 





of the  11 variables in the non-IRA saving equation for IRA contributors.  Its 
estimated coefficient is negative, -3.447  with a t-statistic of 9.429. Taken liter- 
ally, this result  says that  the greater the level of  non-IRA  assets in  1983- 
controlling for age, income, and other variables-the  lower the level of saving 
over the subsequent three years. Thus NIFA is clearly not serving as a control 
for past saving behavior. Instead, it seems apparent that the coefficient reflects 
enormous error in the measurement  of  1983 NIFA. Recall that saving is in- 
ferred from 1983 and 1986 NIFA balances, using a variant of  S = NIFA,,,,  - 
NIFA,,,,(  1 + 79,. Thus any error in NIFA,,,,  will impart a negative bias to the 
coefficient on this variable, and in this case the measurement  error is surely 
very large-large  enough to more than offset the intended role of NIFA as a 
control for heterogeneity. 
The effect of NIFA on q  can be understood by considering the components 
of the specification that determines q.  It is useful to recall that to a first order 
of approximation, q  can be thought of as 
q = [(Actual other saving) - (Underlying other saving)]/(Z* - L), 
where underlying other saving refers to other saving as a function of X  before 
the IRA limit is reached. The important aspect of this formula is that, given 
actual other saving, if the prediction for underlying saving is arbitrarily low, q 
will be arbitrarily large to compensate for the low underlying saving. In partic- 
ular, if predicted underlying saving for limit contributors is lower than the ac- 
tual saving of limit contributors, the shortfall between underlying and actual 
saving can be bridged by a large value of  q.  We show that adding NIFA to the 
specification  yields  implausible  estimates of  underlying  saving  and corre- 
sponding large offsetting increases in q.  Column (1) in table 1.19 shows the 
mean value of estimated Xy. Column (2)  shows Xy + pg[D * h, + (1 -  D) 
* A,]  and represents  the predicted  value of  underlying  saving for limit and 86  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
nonlimit contributors. Column (3) shows predicted values of other saving, ac- 
counting for the upper slope component of other saving for limit contributors. 
It is easy to see from this table why the effect of NIFA is so large. Without 
NIFA (specification 7) the systematic component of underlying  saving (X-y) 
for nonlimit contributors is predicted to be -2,452  and for limit contributors 
759. When NIFA is added the predicted underlying saving for limit contribu- 
tors is reduced from 759 to -  1,959 and for nonlimit contributors is increased 
from -2,452  to 682. Including the X,  and A, terms, without NIFA, predicted 
underlying saving for limit contributors  is substantially higher than for non- 
limit contributors (10,782 vs. 2,084). But when NIFA is added, predicted un- 
derlying saving of limit contributors is reduced from 10,782 to 1,287 and un- 
derlying saving for nonlimit contributors is increased somewhat from 2,084 to 
2,149. With reference to figure 1.8, the underlying  saving function for limit 
contributors is lowered. In particular, predicted underlying saving is now lower 
for limit than for nonlimit contributors, which is inconsistent with the prevail- 
ing heterogeneity concern, that is, that contributors want to save more in all 
forms than noncontributors and that limit contributors want to save more than 
contributors. This means that q,  the slope of the portion above the kink point, 
must be increased to compensate for the low predicted  value of underlying 
saving for limit contributors. Indeed, the difference is made up by the larger q. 
The average predicted value of total other saving for limit contributors is close 
to the actual average-2,920  versus 3,089. Taken literally, specification 7 says 
that limit contributors save more in non-IRA financial assets than nonlimit con- 
tributors, as might be expected. But specification 8, with NIFA included, says 
just the reverse, that limit contributors have a lower propensity than nonlimit 
contributors to save in other forms. 
This feature of the specification is created by the large negative coefficient 
on NIFA, which seems clearly to reflect error in measurement and not, as in- 
tended, a control for saving propensity. Thus the error in measurement of this 
variable imparts substantial bias to the results. We show below that this feature 
of  the  specification  applies  equally  to  the joint maximum  likelihood  esti- 
mation. 
Joint Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
If  the GS model  specification is a correct representation  of the data, then 
both the two-step procedure and joint maximum likelihood estimation provide 
consistent estimates of the model  parameter^.^' This, of course, is not true if 
the specification does not capture the empirical regularities in the data. As with 
the two-step procedure, we begin by using only one  X  variable-income-and 
then expand the specification to include the full set of  variables used by GS. 
37. In appendix A of their paper, GS describe the components of the likelihood function used in 
their analysis. The thjrd component for limit contributors is incorrect. The numerator of the first 
term should include S, -  L, but the L is not included. We assume that this is only a typographical 
error in the paper and that the likelihood function is in fact programmed correctly. 87  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
Table 1.20  Joint Maximum Likelihood Estimates of q  By Specification 
Variables 
In IRA and Other 












Income and NIFA 
All Xs  excluding NIFA 
All Xs  including NIFA 
All Xs excluding NIFA 
All Xs including NIFA 
All Xs excluding NIFA 
All Xs including NIFA 
All Xs excluding NIFA 





All Xs,  no constant 
All Xs,  no constant 
All Xs, plus constant 
All Xs, plus constant 
All Xs, no constant 
All Xs, no constant 
-0.790  0.180 
4.644  0.887 
-  1.468  1.115 







Note: p is fixed at single-equation Tobit estimates, except in specifications I and J 
&Evaluated  at the mean of the X values for limit contributors. 
To emphasize the key features of the model, in most specifications, we fix the 
p parameters at those obtained in a single-equation Tobit estimate of the IRA 
eq~ation.~*  The results are presented in table 1.20. 
As with the two-step estimates, the results change dramatically when NIFA 
is included among the X variables. No matter what the model specification, the 
estimated q  jumps wildly when NIFA is added. For example, when NIFA is 
added to the specification including all X  variables but with q estimated as a 
constant, the estimated value of q  jumps from -  1.468 to 4.355 (specification 
D vs. C). 
Although we were unable to match the GS sample precisely, specification J 
is the same specification used by GS,  and specification I is the GS specification 
excluding NIFA.  Key parameters  of  these  specifications  along with the GS 
estimates are summarized in table 1.21, for four key variables: income, debt, 
nonliquid  assets, and NlFA.  (None of  the estimated coefficients  on the six 
other variables included in the GS analysis is statistically different from zero 
in any of these relationships.) The model J parameter estimates are very close 
to the estimates presented by GS, although our estimate of q  differs somewhat 
from the value obtained by GS-  1.1  I6 versus 1.85  reported by GS. The differ- 
ence arises for two reasons. First, our estimation sample differs from the GS 
sample (107 vs.  117 limit contributors). Second, q is parameterized without a 
constant, and estimated values are extremely sensitive to even small changes 
in the X  values  that  may  arise from slight differences  in the sample. (This 
feature of the estimation procedure is documented below.) The critical features 
38. This has very little effect on the results. In specifications I and J in table 1.20, p is estimated 
jointly with all other model parameters. Table 1.21  Model I without NIFA, Model J with NIFA (GS Equivalent), and GS Estimates: Selected Coefficients 
Noncontributor Other Saving Equation  Contributor Other Saving Equation  q Equation 
Without  With  GS  Without  With  GS  Without  With  GS 
Variable  NIFA  NIFA  Estimate  NIFA  NIFA  Estimate  NIFA  NIFA  Estimate 
Income  5.654  5.638 
Debt  1.175  1.187 
(0.952)  (I  ,243) 
(0.126)  (0.142) 
(0.330)  (0.357) 
(0.045) 
Nonliquid assets  -3.874  -3.866 









-0.963  7.765 
(1.026)  (1.505) 
1.412  1.154 
(0.332)  (0.356) 
0.419  -0.120 











-0.322  -2.773 
(0.693)  (0.821) 
-0.735  -0.486 
(0.248)  (0.255) 
1.094  0.802 
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of the maximum likelihood estimates are the same as those of the two-step pro- 
cedure. 
Estimates for the key variables in table  1.21 indicate that the influence of 
NIFA is enormous, In  the contributor saving equation-the  underlying  level 
of  saving for IRA contributors that have not reached the limit-NIFA  has a 
large and negative coefficient (our estimate is -3.512  and the GS estimate is 
-3.686).  This  suggests that  a one  standard deviation  increase  in  the  1983 
NIFA level (about $100,000) is associated with a decrease in saving of  over 
$35,000 in the  1983-86  period! Apparently the  measurement error in  1983 
NIFA, from which the dependent  variable  is constructed,  swamps any role 
NIFA might play as a control for heterogeneity. 
On the other hand, when  NIFA  is added to the q equation the estimated 
coefficient is large and positive, offsetting the large negative effect in the un- 
derlying saving equation. The size of the coefficient (0.782 in our model J and 
0.985 in GS) is implausibly large, implying that a one standard deviation in- 
crease in the 1983 NIFA level (about $100,000)  will increase q  by almost lo! 
As above, we can understand better the effect of NIFA on q  by considering 
predicted  values of underlying  saving with  and without  this  variable  in  the 
specification.  The appropriate predictions are shown  in table  1.22. Without 
NIFA, predicted underlying  saving of limit contributors is higher than that of 
nonlimit contributors (4,533 vs. 1,65  1). But when NIFA is added, the underly- 
ing saving of limit contributors is Zowered from 4,533 to -760,  leaving a large 
gap between underlying and actual other saving, which is 3,089. The under- 
lying saving of nonlimit  contributors is increased somewhat, from  1,65  1 to 
1,713. Once again, to fit the actual saving data, the gap between underlying 
and actual saving of limit contributors is bridged by the large estimated value 
of  q.  In this case, predicted  other saving of  limit contributors is well above 
actual other saving-4,461  versus 3,089.39  That is, when underlying saving is 
depressed, the slope q  of S, must be raised. With reference to figure 1.8: when 
S is reduced to S’, S,  must be increased to Sl. Or the measurement error in 
NIFA biases the underlying saving downward, and this is offset by an upward 
bias in -q.  Thus, at least in the presence of NIFA, no behavioral interpretation 
can be ascribed to the estimated value of q. 
Although the addition of NIFA has an enormous effect on the other saving 
equation for contributors, the addition of this variable has virtually no effect 
on estimates in the other saving equation for families who do not contribute to 
an IRA, as shown in the first two columns of table 1.2 1. 
In addition to the artificial increase in q  caused by the introduction of NIFA, 
the GS parameterization of  -q-excluding  a constant term-means  that pre- 
dicted changes in q  with changes in X are likely to have little meaning. Without 
39. GS do not report predicted other saving of  limit and nonlimit contributors separately, but the 
predicted value for all contributors, which they do report, is far less than actual other saving of 
contributors ($806 vs. $2,184). 90  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.22  Predicted Underlying Other Saving, Total Other Saving, and Actual Other 




Xy Plus X2  Predicted Other Saving:  Actual Other 
Contributor Type  Xy Only  and  A,  Xy Plus X2 and A, and X,  Saving 




(excludes NIFA)  704  1,651  1,651  1,989 




(excludes NIFA)  1,082  4,533  3,298  3,089 
(includes NIFA)  -2,160  -760  4,461  3,089 
a constant term in the specification, the expected value of q,  given X, is not 
captured by X6 unless the constant is in fact zero.4o  Predictions of q  vary wildly 
in response to small changes in X  variables. Indeed, by judicious selection of 
X values, a wide range of results can be obtained. GS have highlighted  the 
estimated values of q  based on selected X values. For example, GS show values 
for a “typical 35-year-old,”  defined  by  particular X  values. The “typical  35- 
year-old’’ does not  have  an IRA in  1983 and does not  have  an  employer- 
provided pension. Their “predicted” value of  -q  is 0.68. But if, in addition to 
the X values GS use, the person is defined to have an IRA and a pension, the 
value of q  is -  1.565. Based on other X values, almost any q could have been 
emphasized.  Table 1.23  makes the possibilities clear. For each specified change 
in an X  variable the table gives the change in q implied by  the GS estimates, 
reported in their table 5. For each of  the continuous variables, the indicated 
change in the X variable is approximately one standard deviation. Thus the GS 
estimates  themselves  yield  implausible responses  to changes in  household 
characteristics. 
As indicated above, estimation results may vary enormously  based on the 
sample used  in estimation.  Since the results  depend critically on the small 
number of  limit contributors-  1 I7  in the GS estimates-any  selection that 
changes this number can change the results enormously, especially given the 
vast variation in assets and saving. The reported estimates are based on a sam- 
ple deleting households with inferred 1983-86  saving less than or greater than 
40. Specifications G and H in table 1.20 are estimated including a constant term in T, as well as 
the X  variables. Although the constant in  these specifications is not significantly different from 
zero, it is measured extremely imprecisely and identification is tenuous. 91  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
Table 1.23  Change in q  for Selected Changes in X,  Based on GS Estimates 
Change  Variable  Change"  Change in q 
Age 







IRA in  1983 
Increase by  12 years 
Increase by $120,000 
No to yes 
Increase by 3 years 
Increase by  1.5 persons 
Increase by $100,000 
Increase by $40,000 
Increase by $200,000 
No to yes 
0.33  I 
-3.170 




-  1.864 
0.942 
-0.869 
"For each of  the continuous variables the indicated change in the X variable is approximately one 
standard deviation. 
$100,000. Although  they do not report the q values  with samples based on 
different saving thresholds, GS do report their estimates of the proportion of 
an increase in IRA saving, resulting from an increase in the IRA limit, that 
would be net new saving. Here are their examples, which document how sensi- 
tive their results are to the choice of a saving threshold. 
Sample Saving Deletions  Net Saving (%) 
More or less than +$75,000 
More or less than ?$lOO,OOO 




Based on our estimates of the GS model (including NIFA), small differences 
in this critical sample selection criterion yield very different values of q.  Es- 
timates  for selection  thresholds  ranging  from  -+$50,000  to  +$200,000 are 
shown in figure 1.9. Not only is the variation great, but most of the estimates 
are very small, even including NIFA. 
1.7.5  Summary 
In our judgment, a descriptive summary of the data used by GS suggests 
very strongly that the contributions of participants to the IRA program between 
1983 and 1986 represented largely new saving. It is also clear from these data 
that the typical IRA contributor had not been saving close to the typical annual 
IRA contribution of $2,300 per year. Simple predictions of  1986 non-IRA fi- 
nancial assets based on the 1983 cross-sectional relationship between age, in- 
come, and non-IRA financial assets (and accounting for differences in rate of 
return) bolster the message of the raw data, suggesting that most IRA contribu- 
tions must have represented new saving. These "reality checks" would seem to 
be inconsistent with the GS results. 
But GS frame their conclusions in terms of the effect of an increase in the 
IRA limit, arguing that  virtually none of  the  increase  in IRA contributions 92  James M. Poterha, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.9  Estimated q  values by three-year saving threshold 
Note: GS = Gale and Scholz (1994). 
resulting from a limit increase would represent new saving. The summary data 
also suggest that this conclusion  is inconsistent  with the underlying  data. A 
large fraction-60  to 85 percent-of  annual IRA contributions are at a family 
or an individual IRA limit. Thus most of the increase in net saving that seems 
evident from the summary data must be attributed to persons who contributed 
at the limit. And it seems implausible to conclude that  if  the limit had been 
higher these people would not have increased their saving even more. 
GS acclimatize the reader to their conclusion by highlighting the 1986 non- 
IRA financial assets of persons at a constructed IRA limit. GS must infer IRA 
contributions from 1983 and 1986 IRA balances, and from these inferred con- 
tributions, they infer limit status in the three consecutive years between  1983 
and 1986. They classify 117 families in this group and conclude that about 22 
percent of contributors are at this “constructed three-year limit.” They point to 
the rather large non-IRA financial assets of this group, suggesting that because 
these families did have assets that could be transferred to an IRA, that is what 
they would do if the IRA limit were reached. Even with this unverified possibil- 
ity in mind, the number GS highlight  is misleading  for several reasons:  (1) 
While GS point to the assets of 22 percent of participants at a constructed limit, 
the proportion of contributions at either an individual or a family annual limit 
is three or four times this large. It is the assets of this much larger group that 
are relevant. (2) GS further exaggerate relevant non-IRA  financial assets by 
including the assets of all families over age 25, including those over age 65, 
who are unlikely to contribute to an IRA. GS also use a very inclusive defini- 
tion of financial assets, including assets that we believe are unlikely to be sub- 
stituted for IRA assets. (3) Finally, GS emphasize 1986 asset levels. The 1986 
data are relevant if one is drawing attention to what might be expected from a 
“future” increase in the IRA limit. But the  1986 number is at the same time 
misleading because there was a substantial increase in non-IRA financial assets 93  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
of contributors  during the  1983-86  period, during which IRA contributions 
were made. In considering the summary data, we emphasize 1983  assets, draw- 
ing attention to the fact that contributors had not been saving at the typical IRA 
annual contribution rate before the advent of the program. Indeed, the median 
level of the non-IRA financial assets of 1983 IRA contributors was only about 
20 percent of the assets of inferred “three-year limit contributors” emphasized 
by  GS. And the median  1983 non-IRA  financial assets of  the persons who 
contributed at an IRA limit during the 1983-86  period was probably less than 
40 percent of the level emphasized by GS. 
The formal GS results are not based on summary data, however, but rather 
on  a complex estimation method. Having reproduced their estimation proce- 
dure and analyzed it closely, we conclude that the data provide little support 
for their conclusions. The value of  q,  the key substitution parameter reported 
by GS, is estimated with substantial bias because of measurement error in 1983 
non-IRA financial assets. Furthermore, because the parameterization of q  used 
by GS does not include a constant term, the reported variations in q  by family 
attributes have no behavioral meaning whatsoever. These features of the GS 
estimation procedure,  together with values of q that vary wildly  with small 
changes in the sample used in estimation, mean that judicious choice of sample 
family attributes at which to evaluate q  can produce virtually any result. 
But can any specification of the GS model be given credence? In particular, 
can estimates that exclude NIFA and that estimate a constant q  be viewed with 
confidence? We  know  that even in this case, the estimates  vary  widely  de- 
pending on the sample selected for estimation. This is especially critical given 
that the key parameter q is essentially determined by  limit contributors. Ex- 
cluding NIFA, all specifications yield a negative value of q,  which in many but 
not all instances is not significantly different from zero. We also find that al- 
though inclusion of NIFA changes the estimated value of q,  it does not change 
the residual correlation between IRA and other non-IRA financial asset saving. 
When all X  variables other than NIFA are used, the estimated correlation is 
essentially zero. And when NIFA is added the correlation remains essentially 
zero. Thus NIFA does not seem to serve its intended goal of providing further 
control for heterogeneity but does impart substantial bias. It seems evident that 
the results provide little support for a positive  q,  and thus little support for 
substitution of non-IRA financial asset saving for IRA saving. But the results 
obtained without NIFA may also be so fragile as to provide unreliable evidence 
of no effect. 
1.8  Conclusions 
Over the past several years we have undertaken a series of  analyses of the 
effect of IRA and 401(k) contributions on net personal saving. We have sum- 
marized this research here, together  with additional results.  Saver heteroge- 
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and in our studies we have used different methods to address this issue. We 
have organized the discussion according to the method used to correct for het- 
erogeneity. We emphasize that no single method can provide sure control for 
all forms of heterogeneity. Taken together, however, we believe that the analy- 
ses address the key complications presented by heterogeneity. In our view, the 
weight  of  the evidence, based  on  the  many  nonparametric  approaches  dis- 
cussed here, provides strong support for the view  that contributions  to both 
IRA and 401(k) plans represent largely new saving. Some of  the evidence is 
directed to the IRA program, other evidence to the 40  1  (k) plan, and some of 
the evidence to both  plans jointly. We  believe that the evidence is strong in 
all cases. 
Several other investigators have used different methods to consider the effect 
of these retirement saving programs on personal saving and in some cases have 
reached very different conclusions from ours. Thus we have devoted particular 
effort to explaining why different approaches, sometimes based on the same 
data, have led to different conclusions. In some instances, we believe that the 
limitations of the methods used by others have undermined the reliability of 
the results. Particular attention is devoted to a paper by Gale and Scholz (1994) 
that is widely cited as demonstrating  that IRAs have no saving effect. Based 
on our analysis of the data used by  Gale and Scholz, including calculations 
based on a replication of their model, we find that their conclusions are at odds 
with the patterns of  asset holding and saving in the raw data. 
Appendix A 
Cohort and Period Efsects 
Although the data make clear that the timing  of housing  market trends and 
trends in mortgage debt do not coincide, the apparent market, or “period,” ef- 
fects in the housing market complicate the estimation of precise housing data 
cohort effects. For example, the mortgage data by cohort between  1984 and 
1987 show very small cohort effects. But if only the  1987 and 1991 data are 
considered, it would appear that there were substantial cohort effects. But it is 
likely that these within-cohort changes reflect period effects that can show up 
as cohort effects. This is illustrated in figure lA.l,  which shows mortgage debt 
for the C42 and C48 cohorts.  Looking at the  1984 and  1987 data only, no 
cohort effect is apparent, as shown by the narrow line. But if the data are fitted 
by cohort, including the  1991 values, there appears to be a cohort effect. If a 
1991 year effect were accounted for, the apparent cohort effect would essen- 
tially  disappear.  Suppose the  increase  in  mortgage  debt between  1987 and 
1991 resulted from the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Then the data might be inter- 








42  44  46  48  50  52  54 
1  C42  Mortgage Debt  C48  Mortgage Debt I 
Fig. lA.l  Period vs. cohort effect? 
younger cohorts between  ages 44 and 48. For the older cohort, the increase 
was induced between ages 50 and 54. This period effect raises the debt of the 
younger cohort at age 48 and the debt of the older cohort at age 54. This creates 
the illusion of a cohort effect, illustrated by  the vertical distance between the 
two heavy lines. In this case, the apparent cohort effect is really a period effect 
and should be distinguished from a true cohort effect. But with so few observa- 
tion per cohort, we have not tried to do that.41 
Appendix B 
Rate-of-Return Effects 
The potential magnitude of the rate-of-return effect can be approximated as 
follows: Consider the predicted  (by eq. [13]) assets of  persons aged a+3  in 
1983. The average asset level predicted by the 1983 cross-sectional regression 
could-if  the appropriate data were known-be  decomposed this way: 
(B1)  Ao+3 = A,(1  + r_)3  + S(Ao, Y; r-). 
41. As is well known, it is not possible to distinguish age effects from time effects within the 
same cohort. But if age effects are assumed not to depend on cohort-as  is assumed when the effect 
of age is parameterized as in eq. (I  1) in n. 16-then,  in principle, time effects can be estimated. In 
effect, shifts that correspond to changes between years are interpreted as year effects rather than 
within-cohort age effects. It is seems evident from the summary graphs that the data is somewhat 
more complicated than this, because the year effects seem in some cases to have a differential 
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Here A,  represents the assets that persons aged af3  had three years earlier. 
The r- pertains to the rate of return that applied during the three years preced- 
ing 1983. New saving, S(Ao, r; r-), is some function of income over the three- 
year period. The r- in this function recognizes that people might save less if r 
is higher, because the gain from existing assets is greater. Similarly, the assets 
of persons aged a could be decomposed as 
(B2)  An = Aa-3(1 + r_I3 + S(An_3,  Y;  c.1. 
The difference between assets at a+3 and assets at a can then be described as 
(€33) 
Accounting for the change in income between  1983 and 1986, the difference 
predicted by equation (14) could be decomposed this way. But the rate of return 
that determines the difference in assets with a three-year age difference in 1983 
may be different from the rate that obtained in the next three years. To predict 
over the next three years, we would want to use the rate that applied during 
those years. In this case, we would have 
(B4)  Ao+3  - Aa = (Aa -  Aa-3)(l + r+Y + S(A,,  Y;  r+) - S(Aa_,, Y;  r+), 
where r+ is the rate of return that applied between 1983 and 1986. The differ- 
ence between the two predictions is 
(B5)  (Aa -  Aa-,)[(l  + r+)3 -  (1 + r-YI  + [S(Aa,  Y;  r+> - S(A<,,  Y;  r-11 
-  [S(Aa-3, K  r+> - S(Ao_3,  Y; c.11. 
Assume that the last two terms approximately cancel. Then the difference is 
given by the first term. Consider, for example, the AAA bond rate in 1980-82 
versus 1983-85.  The average during the first period was 13.30, and during the 
second period 12.04. The second component of this term is thus negative. So 
correction for the rate of return would reduce the estimated increase. The return 
on other assets may give a different sign, but it seems evident that differences 
in the rate of return could not account for much of the difference between 1983 
and 1986 non-IRA financial assets. 
-  Aa = (Ao -  Aa-3)(l + c.)3 +  Y;  c.) - S(A0-3,  Y; c.1. 97  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
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Appendix C 
Table lC.l  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income 
Income 
Asset Category and 
Eligibility Status  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  >75 
A. Results for 1991 (1991 dollars) 
Total financial assets 
Eligible  2,033 
Not eligible  1,378 
Eligible  538 
Not eligible  663 
Eligible  1,171 
Non-IRA-4Ol(k)  assets 
401(k) assets 
Not eligible  0 
Eligible  0 


















































B. Results for 1987 (1987 dollars) 
Total financial assets 
Eligible  2,061 
Not eligible  1,58  1 
Non-IRA-40l(k)  assets 
Eligible  591 
Not eligible  799 
40  I (k)  assets 
Eligible  456 
Not eligible  0 
Eligible  0 


















































C. Results for 1984 (1984 dollars) 
Non-IRA-401 (k) assets 
Eligible  561  1,042  1,988  3,861*  5,027  11,683*  28,824* 
Not eligible  754  1,138  1,746  3,076  5,082  10,846  21,485 
Eligible  0  0  0  0  0  2,250  3,181 
Not eligible  0  0  0  0  0  1,484  2,084 
IRA assets 
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995). 
*Difference between eligibles and noneligibles is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. Table 1C.2  Summary of Cohort Trends in Home Value, Home Mortgage, and Home Equity 
Cohort 
Age  C42  C44  c46  c48  c50  c52  c54  c56  C58  C60  C62  C64  C66  C68  C70 
A. Mean Home Value Cohort Data 
- 
42  73,740 
44  65,869  72,052 
46  65,675  70,479 
48  80,294  65.74  I  7 1.084 
50  80,102  66,224  7 I ,09  I 
52  83,570  68,135  75,685 
54  81,275  68,374  73.289 
56  80,829  70,817 
58  79,290 










70,456  68,968 
69,293  68.201 
81,552  70.564  70,842 
85,807  68,824  68,734 
79,437  69,097  65,632 
73,018  58,343 
82,451  70,354  62.770 




B. Mean Home Mortgage Cohort Data 
42  26,737 
44  26,066  24,380 
46  23,955  23,415 
48  34,244  21,311  21.648 
50  3 1,920  19,919  19,219 












27,106  16,267  14,462 
23.02 1  14,262  12,316 
20.710  12.482  11,855 
17,234  10,721  10,466 
15,876  9,822  8,857 
15,022  6,683  7,217 
12,935  5,823  6,572 
9,550  5,150  5,009 
12,811  5,150  3,683 
13,505  5,044 
5.766 
10,189 
C. Mean Home Equity Cohort Data 
42  47,003 
44  39,802  47,672 
46  41,720  47,064 
48  46,050  44,430  49,436 
50  48, I82  46.305 
52  53,853 













49,996  58,784 
52,107  58,827 
57,808  56,554  58,914 
58,580  57,974  57,113 




60,742  61,984 
62,141  61,516 
66,502  63,273  59,059 
70,s  I5  67,867  53,334 
69.640  65.204  59.087 
65.764  59,235 
73,873 
78,323 
Nore: All values are in 199  I  dollars. Table 1C.3  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income, 1984 
Income Interval" 
Asset Category and 
Eligibility Status  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  75 + 




I47  550  1,454  2,404  4,732  7,901  3 1,485 
220  545  1,034  2,043  3,748  7,059  2 1,778 
I 
Difference  -73 
Net non-LRA-.-lOl(k) financial 
6  420*  361*  985*  842*  9,708* 
assets 
Eligible  - 
Not eligible 
Difference 
- 1,288  -651  302  716  2,815  6,241  22,068 
-  607  -  348  130  775  2,080  5,208  17,802 
-681  ~  304  172  -  60  735*  I ,034*  4,267* 
Home equity 
Eligible  11,377  16,210  17,486  26,138  31,101  43,185  65,232 
Not eligible  12,384  13,725  16,007  25,123  30,833  34,348  52,746 
Difference  -  1,007  2,486  1,478  1,014  268  8,837*  12,486* Net non-IRA-401 (k) financial 
assets less mortgage debt 
Eligible  -5,329 
Not eligible  -4,468 
Difference  -861 
assets plus home equity 
Eligible  11,594 
Not eligible  11,293 
Difference  30  I 
Net non-IRA-40l(k) financial 
IRA 
Eligible  0 
Not eligible  0 














































-  15,560 








Note: Evaluated at the medians of age, marital status, and education. 
*Income  intervals are indexed to 1987 dollars. 
*Difference between eligibles and noneligibles statistically  significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Table 1C.4  Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k)  Eligibility and Income, 1991 
Income Internal' 
Asset Category and 
Eligibility Status  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  75 + 



















Net total financial assets 
Non-IRA-40  1 (k) financial 

































































-  327 
-164 
-262 
-  142 




































17,756* Net total financial assets 
plus housing equity 
Eligible  14,509 
Not eligible  9, I85 
Difference  5,324 
Net non-IRA-40l(k)  financial 
assets less mortgage debt 
Eligible  -7,112 
Not eligible  -5,800 
Difference  -1,312 
Net non-IRA-401 (k)  financial 
assets plus home equity 
Eligible  9,030 
Not eligible  8,059 
Difference  97 I 
IRA 
Eligible  0 
Not eligible  0 
Difference  0 
Eligible  405 
Difference  405 
401(k) 





















-  12,014* 
-39,584 
-38,977 
-  607 
-63,414 














































43  1 
0 
















Note: Evaluated at the medians of age, marital status, and education. 
"Income intervals are indexed to 1987 dollars. 
*Difference between eligibles and noneligibles statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level Table 1C.5  Mean Demographic Characteristics by  Income Interval, Eligibility, and Year 
Income Interval" 
Eligibility Status and 









































































































































9 1,499  38,895 
43.6  41.4 
15.6  13.7 
0.93  0.69 
266  3,68  I 






























92,  I  I  1  26,533 
45.3  40.7 
15.3  12.9 
0.89  0.58 
171  6,230 
~~  ~ 
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COInment  David Laibson 
What does behavioral economics have to say about the savings incentives de- 
bate? That is the question that David Wise assigned me when he asked me to 
David Laibson is assistant professor of  economics at Harvard University and a faculty research 
fellow of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
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and the  MacArthur Foundation. The author is grateful to Yu-Chin Chen and Xiaomeng Tong for 
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be the official discussant of his survey paper coauthored with Jim Poterba and 
Steven Venti.' I imagine that behavioral economics still does not have a lot of 
name recognition, so it may be helpful to start by defining my terms. In prac- 
tice, behavioral economists tend to emphasize experimental evidence,* valida- 
tion of modeling assumptions, synergies between psychology and economics, 
and skepticism regarding strong rationality assumptions. Why might this per- 
spective be helpful? 
First, let me address the economists who believe that the IRA40l(k) debate 
is unresolved (i,e., economists who believe that it is not yet empirically clear 
to what extent IRAs and 401(k)s increase aggregate savings). Where would 
these economists direct future research? More tests with heroic identification 
assumptions? Efforts to gather new data (e.g., data on pension offsets)? Truly 
random eligibility experiments? Such proposals have merit, but I propose an- 
other alternative: test the theoretical microfoundations of the purported effi- 
cacy of IRAs and 401(k)s. First, those microfoundations must be identified. 
But the microfoundations will not be found in mainstream economic models, 
as Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) have argued in theory and shown with simu- 
lations. These simulations imply that during the first decades after an IRA or 
401(k) is introduced, most of the investment in the asset will reflect asset shift- 
ing. Even after 30 years, the IRA or 401(k) generates no new net capital accu- 
mulation. By contrast, psychological models suggest a host of reasons why 
IRAs  and  40l(k)s-particularly  40  1  (k)s-can  work  to  quickly  generate 
higher levels of net savings. Identifying these psychological factors-for  ex- 
ample, commitment  and social modeling-and  directly testing their impact 
may help to move the IRA40l(k) debate forward. 
Other economists believe that Poterba, Venti, and Wise have already won 
the IRA40l(k) debate. These economists should still be interested in the be- 
havioral perspective for three practical reasons suggested by Bernheim (1  996). 
First, understanding why IRAs and 401(k)s work is necessary for welfare anal- 
ysis. For example, mainstream models do not  measure the possible welfare 
gains that would arise if a defined contribution plan helped a consumer over- 
come a self-control problem. Second, knowing why IRAs and 401(k)s work is 
necessary  for policy  analysis. Proposals to improve or expand these instru- 
ments can be analyzed ex ante only if we have theories about which features of 
these instruments drive their effectiveness. For instance, are the savings effects 
driven by marginal interest effects on rates or self-control effects arising from 
1. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (l996a, 1996b) have already written critiques of the Poterba, Venti, 
and Wise manuscript. Bemheim (1996) and Hubbard and Skinner (1996) have also published sur- 
veys that evaluate the Poterba, Venti, and Wise research program. My comments build on the in- 
sights of Thaler (1994) and Bemheim (1996), who also relate the behavioral economics research 
program to the savings incentives debate. 
2. However, behavioral economists do not view experimental evidence as a substitute for field 
data. Behavioral economists value both kinds of evidence and recognize that high-quality field data 
always trump laboratory evidence. 108  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
penalties and commitment? Third, understanding why IRAs and 401(k)s work 
may generate general insights about consumer behavior that will be applicable 
in domains far removed from the savings incentives literature. For example, 
evidence on self-control problems  in the savings domain may have implica- 
tions for self-regulation in other areas, such as teenage promiscuity, procrasti- 
nation in the workplace, and drug addiction, and may suggest successful public 
or private interventions to combat these problems.’ 
Finally, a third group of economists believe that Engen, Gale, and Scholz 
are basically right. These economists need not read on, as standard economic 
theory is consistent with the Engen, Gale, and Scholz results. However, the 
behavioral perspective may be compatible with their findings. As I will point 
out below, behavioral models sometimes predict that 401(k)s and IRAs are not 
efficacious. Perhaps the most widely discussed example is target behavior. If 
savers have a target level of retirement  savings, they will respond to higher 
after-tax interest rates by saving less. Such target behavior has been formally 
documented in the daily actions of cabdrivers deciding when to end their work- 
days. On days when the shadow wage is high, cabdrivers work shorter hours 
(Camerer et al. 1997). In the analysis that follows I discuss behavioral argu- 
ments that both support and oppose the claim that IRAs and 401(k)s raise net 
national savings. 
I now turn to the general set of insights that behavioral economics brings to 
the IRA-401 (k) discussion. The body of these comments discusses four catego- 
ries of  behavioral phenomena: bounded rationality, self-control problems and 
dynamic inconsistency, peer group sensitivities,  and  overoptimistic  beliefs. 
Three caveats apply to this classification. First, in identifying these categories, 
I have looked for psychological primitives-foundational  theories of cognition 
and motivation. Important behavioral phenomena like mental accounts will be 
discussed in relation to their associated primitives-in  this case bounded ratio- 
nality and self-control problems. Second, I imagine that some of the primitives 
may be interpreted as derivative of others. For example, anomalously high sen- 
sitivities to peer group behavior may result from bounded rationality: “It’s hard 
to calculate the optimal policy, but it’s easy to mimic my neighbor.” Third, my 
list of primitives is undoubtedly incomplete. The psychology literature is vast, 
and it would be foolhardy to believe that behavioral economists have already 
identified all of  the relevant phenomena in that enormous parallel literature. 
This observation should reinforce the obvious conclusion that the behavioral 
research program is just getting started. 
The first section discusses the four behavioral phenomena identified above. 
The second analyzes empirical strategies motivated by this behavioral theory. 
The third section concludes. 
3. See O’Donoghue and Rabin (1997a, 1997b) for a discussion of procrastination and incentives. 109  Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation 
Four Behavioral Phenomena 
Bounded Rationality 
A number of commentators (e.g., Zeckhauser 1986; Thaler 1994; Bernheim 
1994, 1995) have noted that classical arguments for rationality fall short when 
applied to the life cycle savings problem. Retirement savers do not get a second 
chance to correct or learn from their mistakes. There is little recourse for the 
75-year-old who finds herself short of assets. Moreover, we should expect such 
mistakes to be made often since the lifetime accumulation problem is extraor- 
dinarily ~omplex.~  Expert advice only further complicates the picture. The ad- 
vice offered by professional financial planners bears little resemblance to the 
prescriptions of  economic theory (Bernheim 1994). Expert advice is usually 
organized around simple rules of thumb-for  example, save 15 percent of your 
income each year. But simple rules of thumb do not come close to approximat- 
ing the accumulation dynamics predicted by current optimization theory. Fi- 
nally, suboptimal retirement  savings does not drive the consumer out of the 
market. How can an arbitrageur exploit someone else’s mistaken decision to 
underaccumulate for retirement? 
These arguments, and many others like them in the articles cited above, sug- 
gest that lifetime consumption behavior may be poorly approximated by  the 
predictions of the rational actor model. But it is not at all clear what alternative 
to adopt. There are no well-studied and generally applicable psychological re- 
placements  for the rational  choice  modeL5 Although  behavioral economics 
cannot offer a general replacement for the rational choice model, there are two 
widely held behavioral principles that are useful for thinking about choices in 
a boundedly rational world: simplification and salience. I will discuss each of 
these areas in turn. 
Consumers simplify their decision problems by adopting rules of thumb and 
heuristics (e.g., never go into debt). One particularly important heuristic is to 
4.  Assuming only three state variables, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) were compelled to 
use the Cornell supercomputer to compute optimal lifetime consumption rules. 
5. Reinforcement models, in which decision makers repeat actions that have had relatively high 
payoffs in the past, have only just begun to be studied empirically by  economists (e.g.. Roth and 
Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1997) and extended to incorporate limited forward-looking properties 
(Camerer and Ho 1996). Moreover, most of this work analyzes subject choices in repeated games, 
where subjects receive payoffs at the end of every round. Even if we had confidence in such models 
in the repeated game setting, the reinforcement model would be difficult to apply to the savings 
context since it is not at all clear why savings is rewarding in the short run. How can reinforcement 
models explain savings activity that generates payoffs that are not realized for several decades? 
Other leading psychological models of choice, like Herrnstein’s “melioration and matching” para- 
digm suffer from similar critiques about the timing of rewards (see Rachlin and Laibson, 1997, for 
a survey). Melioration predicts that decision makers always choose the activity with the highest 
instantaneous felicity, ignoring future consequences. Such radically myopic psychological models 
seem to be inherently ill equipped for application to savings behavior. Such models could explain 
savings activity if  the primary return to saving were the intrinsic rewards of the process, but that 
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partition  the decision problem into simpler subproblems, just as economists 
work with partial equilibrium analysis despite spillovers beyond the arena stud- 
ied. Such partitioning  generates  separate  “mental  accounts” for day-to-day 
consumption  needs  and retirement accumulation  (Thaler and Shefrin  198  1  ; 
Thaler 1985) and associated anomalous wealth nonfungibilities (Thaler 1990). 
For example, consumers may feel that  it is appropriate to consume a wage 
windfall (e.g., overtime pay), but inappropriate to increase consumption at all 
in response to an equally large capital gain windfall in their retirement account. 
The second behavioral principal is information salience. Salient information 
and  rewards  disproportionately  influence  behavior  (e.g., see the surveys by 
McArthur 1981; Taylor and Fiske 1978). Current rewards are more salient than 
future rewards. When one spends $15 on a CD it is hard to imagine the retire- 
ment consumption sacrifice that this current splurge necessitates. This creates 
a bias for current consumption over retirement savings. 
Instruments like 401  (k)s and IRAs engage these two behavioral principles. 
For example, a retirement account should be viewed as a mental account that 
has been coded as off-limits to current consumption. Thaler (1994) points out 
that investments in these accounts may raise long-term  accumulation levels, 
even if the original investment was generated by asset shifting. These long-run 
effects arise because the asset is moved from an account with a high marginal 
propensity for consumption (MPC)-say  a demand deposit-to  a retirement 
account with a low MPC. More generally, providing retirement accounts like 
401(k)s and IRAs creates new “basins  of attraction” for savings that would 
otherwise eventually be consumed. Hence, mental accounting arguments sug- 
gest that 401(k)s and IRAs raise accumulation levels. Similarly, salience ef- 
fects generally strengthen the case for 401(k)s and IRAs. These savings instru- 
ments directly (through their existence) and indirectly (through the associated 
activities of firms and coworkers) focus attention on retirement needs. 
Other decision-making heuristics, however, imply that special savings in- 
struments  will  lower  savings.  For  example,  target  saving-as  discussed 
above-implies  that higher returns would lower current contributions. Like- 
wise, a fixed savings rule-save  15 percent of my gross income every year- 
implies that 401(k)s and IRAs lower net national savings, due to the tax break 
associated with these instruments. 
Simplification  and salience effects coexist  in  the behavioral  mechanisms 
discussed by Ross and Nisbett (1991). These leading social psychologists em- 
phasize that behavior is powerfully influenced by subtle situational factors that 
they call “channel factors.” The success of behavioral interventions “depends 
not just on persuading people to hold particular beliefs, or even to develop 
particular  intentions, but also on facilitating a specific, well-defined  path or 
channel for action” (Ross and Nisbett 1991,47).  The channel factors that prove 
most effective drastically  simplify the action space available to the decision 
maker. This simplification occurs on two fronts. An effective channel factor 
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the option of postponing the decision. Hence, the channel factor makes the 
action salient. 
Ross and Nisbett cite numerous examples of effective channel factors, in- 
cluding the techniques used during the  1940s U.S. war bond campaigns. As 
Cartwright (1949) reports, these campaigns proved most successful when they 
identified a clear action (buy an extra $100 bond) and a specific time at which 
to implement that action (buy it when the solicitor at your workplace asks you 
to sign up). As Cartwright notes, “The essential function of solicitation lay in 
the fact that it required the person to make a decision” (1949,266). The Home 
Shopping Network  also seems to have adopted  these  lessons. Consider  the 
flashing phone number that accompanies an announcement that a discount will 
expire in x minutes. Or consider a TV charity telethon that solicits an immedi- 
ate phone  call to lift  the fund-raising  drive  over some “critical”  threshold: 
“Once you take that initial step by making the phone call, they take care of 
everything. In other words, they create a behavioral channel that very reliably 
transforms a long-standing but vague intention, or even a momentary whim, 
into a completed donation” (Ross and Nisbett 1991, 48).6 
Channel factors lower the action hurdle for cognitively overloaded decision 
makers. If decision makers were sufficiently cognitively sophisticated, channel 
factors such as arbitrary deadlines, or a narrowing of the choice set, would not 
work. By contrast, boundedly rational decision makers would be expected to 
respond to the simpler and immediate choices associated with channel factors. 
For my purposes, the most important attribute of channel factors is their 
close correspondence to 401(k)s, and to a lesser degree IRAs. A 401(k) simpli- 
fies the choice set by (1) identifying a narrow range of contribution rates (zero 
to 15 percent of  income), (2) identifying a specific salient contribution level 
(e.g., the highest contribution rate at which the firm will match the employee), 
and (3) identifying a narrow set of investment options (e.g., five mutual funds). 
In addition, 401(k)s provide  a sign-up deadline, discouraging  the option of 
postponing action. The salary reduction forms are distributed to employees in 
early December and are due back to the fringe benefits office by the end of the 
month. In this way 401(k)s transform a vague intention to save into a series of 
concrete events (automatic withdrawals). Analogous arguments can be made 
for IRAs. This analysis emphasizes that IRAs and 401(k)s increase accumula- 
tion by facilitating and focusing attention on the retirement accumulation de- 
cision. 
Self-Control and Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences 
There is a substantial gap between  actors’  long-term  intentions and their 
short-term actions. When two rewards are both due far away in time, decision 
makers will generally choose the larger later reward over the smaller earlier 
6. For another interesting example of a channel factor at work see Leventhal, Singer, and Jones 
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reward (e.g., the $100 restaurant meal in  150 weeks is preferred to the $90 
meal in 145 weeks). But, when both rewards are brought forward in time, pref- 
erence tilts toward the earlier reward (the $90 meal in one week is preferred to 
the $100 meal in six weeks). Experiments of this form have been done with a 
wide range of real rewards, including money, durable goods, fruit juice, sweets, 
video rentals, relief  from noxious noise,  and access to video games7  Such 
reversals should be well understood by academics, whose long-term intentions, 
“revising that paper over the summer,” often conflict with their actual choices, 
“I had too many interruptions and didn’t end up finding time for it until Janu- 
ary.” Invariably, our long-term intentions to delay gratification are at least par- 
tially defeated by our day-to-day temptations to seize immediate payoffs. 
This gap between intentions and actions also arises in the life cycle savings 
domain. Three types of evidence highlight this gap. First, popular and profes- 
sional financial advice emphasizes  the need to commit oneself to a savings 
plan. For example, “Use whatever means possible to remove a set amount of 
money from your bank account each month before you have a chance to spend 
it” (Rankin 1993). Or “If you wait until the end of the month to put your money 
into investments, you’ll probably encounter months in which there’s nothing 
left over. To keep this from happening, pay yourself first by having money set 
aside from each paycheck into a savings account or 401(k) plan” (American 
Express 1996). Financial planners routinely advise their clients to cut up credit 
cards, to put credit cards in a safe deposit box, to use excess withholding as a 
forced savings device,R  and to use Christmas clubs, vacation clubs, and other 
low-interest, low-liquidity goal clubs to regulate savings flows. American con- 
sumers deposited their holiday  savings in roughly  10 million Christmas club 
accounts in  1995 (Simmons Market Research  Bureau  1996). Such commit- 
ment  devices  are  only  appealing because consumers recognize  their  self- 
control problems. 
Self-reports  about preferred  consumption paths provide a second type of 
evidence for the gap between intentions and actions. Consumers generally re- 
port a preference for flat or rising real consumption paths, even when the real 
interest rate is zero (Barsky et al. 1997; see Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991, 
for related evidence). But consumers actually implement  downward-sloping 
consumption paths when they are not effectively liquidity constrained (Gourin- 
chas and Parker 1996). Moreover, the typical baby boomer household is saving 
at one-third the rate required to finance a standard of living during retirement 
comparable to the standard of  living that the household enjoys today  (Bern- 
heim  1995).9 Hence, U.S. consumers report a preference for rising consump- 
7. See Solnick et al. (1980). Navarick (1982), Millar and Navarick (1984), King and  Logue 
(1987). Kirby and Herrnstein (1995), Kirby and Marakovic (1995, 1996), Kirby (1997), and Read 
et al. (1996). See Ainslie (1992) for a partial review of  this literature. 
8. For interesting evidence on the relatively widespread use of  intentional overwithholding, see 
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995). 
9. Bernheim points out that this calculation assumes a best-case scenario. He  assumes that all 
savings is available for retirement and that mortality rates, tax rates, social security benefits, Medi- 
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tion profiles-holding  the net present value constant-but  actually implement 
profiles that are downward sloping. 
Finally, comparison of target and actual savings rates provides a third type 
of evidence for the gap between intentions and actions. Baby boomers report 
a median target savings rate of 15 percent and a median actual savings rate of 
5 percent  (Bernheim  1995). Baby boomers apparently understand  that they 
save less than they should. 
Numerous authors have used multiple-self frameworks to formally model 
the gap between intentions and actions (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Schel- 
ling 1984; Hoch and Loewenstein  1991; Akerlof 1991; Ainslie 1992; Laibson 
1996, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin  1997a, 1997b). These models highlight 
the contest between the short-run desire for instantaneous gratification and the 
long-run desire to be patient. IRAs and 401(k)s provide a set of commitment 
technologies that enable and encourage the present self to lock in choices that 
ensure that one’s long-term, patient interests are heeded in the future. For ex- 
ample, 401(k)s compel consumers to set up  an  automatic  deposit  system; 
changes to the preset deposit levels are sometimes difficult or impossible to 
make on short notice. Assets in IRAs and 401(k)s are partially protected from 
splurges since preretirement withdrawals from these accounts generally face a 
10 percent penalty. Finally, for limit contributors, withdrawals cannot be rede- 
posited, implying that the consumer is penalized by both the 10  percent penalty 
and the loss of future tax deferrals. 
Laibson (1996) shows that an appropriate combination of penalties and tax 
deferrals will implement the first-best consumption  path for a multiple-self 
consumer with a “hyperbolic” discount function-a  discount function charac- 
terized by short-term impatience and long-term patience. This work also dem- 
onstrates that currently enacted penalty and subsidy magnitudes are approxi- 
mately optimal with respect to the calibrated model. Moreover, if consumers 
have hyperbolic preferences, the welfare gains associated with 40  1  (k) avail- 
ability are quite large-approximately  equal to one year of output. However, 
this theoretical work needs to be generalized to more realistic economic envi- 
ronments that allow for uncertainty and assume the availability of other pre- 
existing commitment devices, like defined benefit pensions. 
What do these self-control models predict when 401(k)s are introduced into 
an economy in which self-control mechanisms already exist? Might consumers 
simply shift their assets or their marginal savings from preexisting self-control 
assets-for  example, an illiquid asset like home equity or a defined benefit 
pension plan-to  the new 401(k)? Perhaps mental accounts provide enough 
implicit self-control to make 401(k)s redundant. A 401(k) might not provide 
any additional commitment if a sufficient array of  commitment technologies 
are already available in its absence. In such cases, 401(k) availability might 
lower savings, since the 401(k) would simply have an income effect without 
any corresponding marginal impact on the capacity for commitment. 
However, 401  (k)s probably provide better commitment opportunities than 
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401(k)s are often harder to borrow  against and better diversified than home 
equity, making 401(k)s a more desirable retirement savings instrument for an 
actor with a self-control problem. Moreover, 401(k)s may also be more effec- 
tive than mental accounts; 401(k)s create external penalties that are far more 
forceful than  the psychic costs that regulate  mental  accounting rules.  Mark 
Twain tried to use mental accounts to limit himself to one cigar per day: “I was 
getting cigars made for me-on  a yet larger pattern. . . .  Within the month my 
cigar had grown  to such proportions that I could have used it as a crutch” 
(Twain [1899] 1906, 10).1° W. C.  Fields (n.d.) also had trouble effectively im- 
plementing mental accounting rules. Fields viewed alcohol as nothing more 
than a snakebite remedy, “which I always keep handy.” He only permitted him- 
self a drink “after first being bitten by a snake . . . which I also keep handy.” 
Mental accounts may be far too labile to provide meaningful self-discipline. 
Other commitment mechanisms, like defined benefit pension plans, and other 
illiquid  assets  should  be  evaluated  as possible  substitutes for 401(k)s. The 
401(k) will increase net savings to the extent that 401(k)s provide new, more 
effective,  and  more  valued  commitment  technologies relative  to these  pre- 
existing retirement instruments. 
Finally, it is useful to revisit the discussion of channel factors in light of the 
self-control issues raised in this subsection. I have already noted that 401(k)s 
and IRAs reduce the complexity of  the accumulation decision. In addition, 
401(k)s and IRAs should be interpreted as channel factors that help would-be 
savers overcome self-control problems, especially procrastination. 
Like the war bond solicitation techniques analyzed by Cartwright (quoted 
above), 401  (k)s and IRAs impose decision-making deadlines. For procrastina- 
tors who would rather postpone any difficult or unpleasant task until tomorrow, 
such deadlines may make an important difference in their outcomes. Ross and 
Nisbett conclude that the most effective interventions are “channel factors that 
facilitate the link between positive intentions and constructive actions” (199  1, 
227). Whether the behavioral hurdle is problem complexity or a self-control 
problem like procrastination, 40  1  (k)s and IRAs serve as canonical channel fac- 
tors that make it easier to do the right thing. 
Peer-Group Sensitivities 
“When trying to get people to change familiar ways of  doing things, social 
pressures and constraints exerted by the informal peer group represent the most 
. . . powerful inducing force than can be exploited to achieve success” (Ross 
and Nisbett 1991,9). Myriad studies have shown that social modeling can have 
a disproportionate  impact  on outcomes.  For example,  Borgida  and Nisbett 
(1  977) gave undergraduates mean course evaluations based on ratings of  stu- 
dents who had already taken the courses. This information did not influence 
10. The Twain quote and the Fields quote that follows were brought to my attention by Ainslie 
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subsequent course choices. By contrast, brief face-to-face comments about the 
courses had a substantial impact. Rushton and Campbell (1977) showed that 
requests for blood donation pledges that were successful 25 percent of the time 
in the absence of any social model produced a positive response 67 percent of 
the time when an unknown confederate made a pledge just before the subject 
was asked. In addition, none of the subjects in the no-model condition showed 
up to give blood, while half of  the subjects who agreed to give blood in the 
model  condition ultimately did.” “The lesson is among social psychology’s 
most important ones. When we want people to translate their positive inten- 
tions  into equally positive  actions, and when exhortations and reasoned ap- 
peals seem to be of  limited effectiveness, a little social demonstration can be 
invaluable” (Ross and Nisbett  199  1, 222-23).12 
Social  demonstration  effects  interact  with  401(k)s  in  two  ways.  First, 
401(k)s increase social learning. Contrast a firm in which all workers invest on 
their own to one in which all workers invest in the same 401(k) plan. In  the 
401(k) firm, the workers face similar narrow choice sets, making it easier to 
learn from each others’ experiences. Hence, the 401(k) effectively coordinates 
all of the employees’ investment decisions and enhances learning externalities. 
Moreover, in the 401(k) firm, dialogue about the investment decision is more 
likely to be formally and informally encouraged at the workplace, thereby fa- 
cilitating social learning and increasing the salience of savings choices and the 
attention devoted to such decisions. 
Second, 401  (k)s increase social competition in the savings domain. Frank 
(1985) summarizes a wide range of evidence that actors care about their rela- 
tive social ranking. Such competition is more likely in domains where choices 
are easily compared, like consumption. In a firm with a 401(k), workers can 
also compare their retirement savings with those of other workers. The workers 
share a common savings benchmark-the  contribution rate-and  a workplace 
norm that is likely to encourage discussion about savings choices. Such com- 
munications augment interworker competition in the savings domain, generat- 
ing a predicted increase in accumulation rates. However, this increase is miti- 
gated by the fact that the competition is likely to be focused exclusively on the 
401(k) accumulation choice, generating an incentive for asset shifting out of 
other less public savings categories. 
Overoptimism 
When subjects evaluate their past performance, future prospects, and attri- 
butes, they consistently exhibit self-enhancing beliefs. Although there exists 
substantial controversy over the source of this bias-the  biased beliefs may be 
11.  Rushton and Campbell’s  results need to be replicated with  a larger sample. They report 
results for 35 subjects, but only 8 of these subjects were in the no-model condition. 
12. Other dramatic social demonstration effects have been documented by Sherif (1937), Asch 
(1951, 1952, 1955,1956),  Lewin (1952), Rohrer et al. (1954). Jacobs and Campbell (1961), Bryan 
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“motivated,” like wishful thinking, or they may be unmotivated cognitive er- 
rors-the  bias itself  is well documented. Only depressed  subjects appear to 
have correctly calibrated beliefs (Taylor and Brown 1988). 
In one commonly used test of self-enhancing  beliefs, researchers ask sub- 
jects to rate themselves relative to a comparison group. For example, Svenson 
(198  1) asks subjects to evaluate their skill and safety as drivers in comparison 
to the other subjects in the study; 49 percent of the subjects reported that they 
were above the 70th percentile in skill and 68 percent of the subjects reported 
that they were above the 70th percentile in safety. Weinstein (1980) asks sub- 
jects to evaluate whether they were more or less likely than their peers to expe- 
rience a set of  positive and negative life events (e.g., starting salary > $15,000 
or not finding a job for six months). The beliefs reflected a self-enhancing bias 
for 88 percent of the life events. Studies like these have been replicated dozens 
of times.I3 
A small set of papers have evaluated these biases in settings where real re- 
wards were at stake. For example, Ito (1990) analyzes the forecasts made by 
foreign exchange experts employed by Japanese firms. Forecasters whose firms 
benefit from depreciations tend to forecast a weaker yen than forecasters whose 
firms benefit from an appreciation. Kidd and Morgan (1969) and Kidd (1970) 
report the forecasts made by  plant engineers regarding completion times for 
plant repairs. Actual completion times usually fell outside of the 99 percent 
confidence intervals estimated by the engineers. This bias persisted during the 
study period, despite repeated educational initiatives and the establishment of 
incentives for accurate reporting. Lovallo and Camerer (1996) conduct a labo- 
ratory experiment in which subjects decide whether to enter a market in which 
they compete based on their answers to trivia questions. The subjects repeat- 
edly exhibit overentry, generating negative average payoffs across entrants. 
Such biases seem to influence the retirement accumulation decision as well. 
Bernheim (1995) reports that the typical baby boomer expects his or her stan- 
dard of  living in retirement to be about the same as it is today. But Bernheim’s 
calculations  suggest that  this subjective belief  is unwarranted. As discussed 
above, the typical baby boomer household  is saving at one-third the rate re- 
quired to finance a standard of living during retirement comparable to the one 
enjoyed today. 
If consumers are overoptimistic, 401  (k)s will raise their retirement accumu- 
lation levels. Consider a consumer who overoptimistically forecasts too few 
negative wealth shocks (e.g., car or home repairs, medical and dental bills). In 
the absence of a 401(k), the overoptimistic consumer will forecast a level of 
13. The literature on self-enhancing beliefs is quite large. Some of  the more prominent experi- 
mental papers include those of Marks (195  l), Irwin (1953), Fischhoff and Beyth (1975), Langer 
(1975), Miller (1976), Snyder, Stephan, and Rosenfield (1976). Stephan, Rosenfield. and Stephan 
(1976). Larwood and Whittaker (1977), Sicoly and Ross (1977), Riess et al. (l98l),  Zakay (1983, 
AIicke (1985), Brown (1986). Campbell (1986), and Perloff and Fetzer (1986). For helpful reviews, 
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savings that she will not be likely to attain. Such consumers may end up gener- 
ating negligible  accumulations.  However,  in the presence  of  a 401(k),  such 
consumers will “lock in” a high savings rate at the beginning  of each year. 
When the inevitable negative income shocks occur, the consumer will be more 
likely to cut consumption rather than savings. Such effects will be weakened 
to the extent that the consumer can either dissave from non-40l(k) forms of 
financial wealth or readily reduce her 401(k) contribution rate. 
Field Data Tests: A Few Suggestions 
The behavioral perspective on 401(k)s suggests numerous empirical strate- 
gies. Some of these have already been explored. For  example, Bayer, Bern- 
heim, and Scholz (1996) find that participation in and contributions to volun- 
tary  savings plans  are significantly higher  when  employers offer retirement 
seminars. Of course, perfectly rational (and fully informed) consumers would 
not be affected by such initiatives. Bayer et al. also find that written materials, 
such as newsletters and summary plan descriptions have no effects on savings, 
providing support for social psychology  theories that emphasize the central 
role of  social demonstration  and group participation.  Bernheim  and Garrett 
(1996) find complementary evidence that financial education at the workplace 
increases household retirement accumulation levels. 
Other sources of variation should be used to test behavioral hypotheses. For 
example, many of the commitment properties of 401(k) plans, discussed above, 
vary across plans. Some plans enable participants  to quickly and frequently 
fine-tune their contribution levels, while other plans make such changes diffi- 
cult or effectively impossible to implement. Borrowing rules also differ across 
plans,  with  variation  arising  in the consumption categories  for which  bor- 
rowing is allowed (e.g., tuition, medical expenses, home purchase, cars, vaca- 
tions), as well as the simplicity or speed of the borrowing procedure.14  As one 
pension consultant describes it, in certain cases “all employees do is punch a 
couple of  numbers into the phone and a check magically appears” (quoted in 
Schultz 1995).  Behavioral theories predict that plans with weaker commitment 
properties will tend to engender less long-run wealth accumulation. However, 
there may be a trade-off here. Extremely low levels of flexibility may discour- 
age contributions in the first place. 
Default features of 401(k) plans provide another useful source of variation. 
Many plans at large firms now make plan participation the default assignment. 
Moreover, within this set of firms, the default contribution levels vary substan- 
14. BancOne recently developed a program to give 401(k)  participants credit cards with which 
they could borrow against their 401  (k) accumulations. Such a simple borrowing procedure would 
dramatically undermine the commitment  properties of  this instrument. Perhaps this is why  the 
proposal was opposed by U.S. Representative Charles Schumer, who introduced a bill to restrict 
such cards, foreshadowing Bancone’s  decision to cancel the program (“Bankone drops Credit 
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tially. Differences in the default assignment should be used to test the behav- 
ioral hypotheses that boundedly rational consumers tend to take the path of 
least resistance, or that consumers fear the consequences of changes, or weigh 
heavily the regret of errors of commission versus those of omission. Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser (1988) call such propensities status quo bias. 
Social demonstration effects may also vary in measurable ways across firms. 
Some types  of  workers have relatively few opportunities  for interemployee 
communication-for  example, mail and package delivery workers and inter- 
state truck drivers-while  other workers have substantial opportunities for in- 
teraction. In addition, some firms organize savings discussion groups among 
their employees. Finally, some firms may actually encourage cross-worker sav- 
ings comparisons by publicizing the distribution of their employees’ contribu- 
tion rates. An inexpensive experiment could be run along these lines, by actu- 
ally  asking  a treatment  group  of  firms  to publicize  this  information  at the 
workplace. 
There  may  also  be  important  sources  of  systemic  variation  in  the  tax- 
deferred instruments under study. For example, the Canadian retirement sav- 
ings system adopted a new set of rules in 1992: workers who did not make the 
maximum allowable contribution in a given year could now cany forward the 
difference, enabling them to contribute more than the maximum in subsequent 
years.I5 Standard economic theory suggests that this policy change should in- 
crease  steady  state  contribution  levels  (since  the  choice  set  has  been  ex- 
panded),  while behavioral  theories,  which emphasize  self-control  problems 
and procrastination, would predict a deterioration in asset accumulation. 
Beyond institutional and environmental variation, it may also be productive 
to exploit variation in household demographics. Households whose heads have 
relatively low levels of education will be more sensitive to many of the behav- 
ioral effects described above. Social demonstration  and learning effects will 
be strongest for households who do not have extensive financial knowledge 
and preexisting active investment strategies. Likewise households with limited 
budgeting  experience  and  lots of  “unpredictable”  expenses-for  example, 
young households with children or new home owners-may  be most suscep- 
tible to the overoptimism biases discussed above and hence will be most likely 
to increase their accumulation rate as a result of 40 1  (k) availability. 
The behavioral approach also suggests that empiricists focus more attention 
on little-studied  psychological variables like the gap between  savings inten- 
tions and savings outcomes (Bernheim  1995). Is this gap smaller for 401(k) 
eligible savers? Is this gap smaller for employees who receive free financial 
advice at the workplace? Standard economic theories cannot explain the exis- 
tence of this gap, let alone its likely variation with environmental variables. By 
contrast, behavioral theories are based on the existence of such gaps and  have 
much to say about the mechanisms that open and close them. 
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This short list of empirical examples is guided by the unifying principle that 
it may be possible to specifically test the behavioral microfoundations of IRA 
and 401(k) efficacy. Such tests will be useful in determining whether-and,  if 
the answer is affirmative, why-these  instruments work. 
Conclusion 
Most  of  the  behavioral  analysis  that  I  have  reviewed  implies  that  tax- 
deferred  retirement  instruments  will  raise net  national  savings. However, I 
want to conclude with four notes of caution. First, as I have repeatedly empha- 
sized, behavioral arguments sometimes work against IRA and 401(k) efficacy 
(e.g., target saving). 
Second, almost all of the behavioral effects reviewed above will be at least 
partially offset by asset shifting. For example, even if 401(k)s provide an excel- 
lent commitment device for actors with poor self-control, 401(k)s will only 
raise accumulation if this commitment device is not a close substitute for pre- 
existing commitment devices like home equity or mental accounts. Likewise, 
even if 40 l(k)s generate social demonstration  or competition effects,  which 
elevate contribution rates, this may simply draw away accumulation from other 
less public savings categories. 
Third, many of the strongest behavioral arguments in support of tax-deferred 
investment vehicles  apply only to 401(k)s. For example, IRAs generate less 
commitment, since they are rarely funded with a preannounced automatic de- 
posit scheme. IRAs function less well as a channel factor, since they are not 
associated  with workplace  solicitation. IRAs generate  fewer peer group ef- 
fects, since they are less likely to be discussed with coworkers. Finally, IRAs 
benefit less from overoptimism effects than do 401(k)s, since 401(k) alloca- 
tions are preannounced before the resolution of uncertainty. 
Behavioral economics emphasizes learning, which leads to a fourth note of 
caution. In a simple laboratory experiment, subjects are usually given a chance 
to participate in mock trials of a game before any rewards are actually at stake 
or any data is recorded. Once the game is played “for real,” the experimenters 
almost always repeat the game for several rounds-usually  at least 10. In most 
games, the play at round 1 looks very little like the play 10 rounds later. It takes 
subjects a long time to learn how to play, despite the extraordinary simplicity 
of almost all laboratory experiments. 
By  comparison, the 401(k)  experiment is effectively  little more  than  10 
years old. Moreover, most of the empirical data that Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
have analyzed to date is from the first half of this experiment, when relatively 
sophisticated investors presumably represented a large share of the participant 
pool. Note that these sophisticated investors would be the least likely to exhibit 
many of  the behavioral effects outlined in this essay. Hence, the Poterba-Venti- 
Wise results may be biased against finding 40 1  (k) efficacy. On the other hand, 
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eventually learn how to shift assets optimally, or learn how to subvert the com- 
mitment properties of 401(k)s. Will savers eventually grow quite comfortable 
borrowing against their 401(k)s, just as they  have grown more comfortable 
taking  out home  equity  credit  lines? Further complicating  the  picture,  the 
401(k) experiment has coincided with over a decade of abnormally high equity 
returns; 401(k) popularity could depend on a booming stock market. It is prob- 
ably necessary to conclude that the existing empirical analysis of 401(k) effec- 
tiveness may tell us little about steady  state responses to this new asset cat- 
egory. 
Nevertheless, the prospects for 401(k)s and similar tax-deferred retirement 
instruments seem bright. Social psychology research has identified a core set 
of features of successful behavioral  interventions. The 401(k) seems to have 
been designed by  someone who intuitively or formally understood those les- 
sons. 
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